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WELCOMING REMARKS
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Mr. ChiefJustice, distinguished members
of the panel, guests, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen, good evening.
My name is Ira Robbins; I am a Professor of Law here at the Washing-
ton College of Law of American University. To celebrate the
Centennial of the Washington College of Law, we have had two full
days of academic panels on numerous topics concerning the future
of law and legal education. Now, in what is a momentous event for
the law school and what I trust will be a significant component of the
ongoing debate concerning the federal judiciary, I am proud to
commence our Plenary Panel on "The Future of the Federal Courts."
It is my pleasure to open the session by welcoming you and by
introducing the dean of our law school. Claudio Grossmanjoined the
faculty of the Washington College of Law in 1983 as Professor of Law
and director of our newly established international legal studies
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program. Starting with just one-student, in twelve years he developed
that program into one that is now ranked ninth in the United States
with more than 150 students from fifty countries. Claudio Grossman
was named dean of the law school in 1995. Dean Grossman is the
author of many books and articles on international law, human rights,
and the law of international organizations. He has also served as legal
counsel to victims of human rights abuses in the Americas in several
landmark cases. In recognition of his work in international human
rights, Claudio Grossman was elected in 1992 to serve on the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, which investigates human
rights abuses as part of the Organization of American States ("OAS").
In further recognition of his contributions in this area, last month the
General Assembly of the OAS elected Dean Grossman President of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. It is my great
pleasure to present my colleague, Claudio Grossman, Dean of the
Washington College of Law.
(Applause)
DEAN GROSSMAN: Thank you, Professor Robbins. Mr. Chief
Justice, President Ladner, honored members of the judiciary, alumni,
students, colleagues, and friends, I am pleased to welcome you this
evening, and I am delighted that you are able to join us in the new
home of the Washington College of Law. All of us at the law school
are honored that the ChiefJustice and the distinguished panelists are
able to join us in celebrating our Centennial.
Our new state-of-the-art facility is one of the most advanced in the
country and in the world. At every seat of every classroom and the
library, students have access to computerized legal research services.
This sophisticated technology allows us to bring the most up-to-date
teaching materials into every classroom and creates opportunities to
better fulfill our educational mission.
One hundred years ago, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillette
became the first women to establish a law school in the United States,
or for that matter, in the world. Their idea was to provide access to
legal education on the basis of equality for both men and women.
They also believed that lawyers and the legal system had an essential
role to play in the advancement of human dignity. Their powerful
message has inspired this institution to develop nationally and
internationally recognized programs in clinical education, internation-
al law, business law, law and government, women and the law, and
environmental law.
To highlight the continued vitality of our founders' message, we
have organized the Centennial around the theme of the past, present,
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and future of legal education and the legal system. Our community
has organized a five-day academic program attracting leading
academicians, practitioners, judges, and others to discuss substantive
legal issues such as: securities litigation; legal education; race and
gender; crime and justice; work and family; and the international
protection of human rights. To complete the celebration, nothing
could be more fitting than to have William Rehnquist, Chief Justice
of the United States, give the Keynote Address and to have this
distinguished panel discuss the future of the federal courts.
An independent and impartial judiciary is the cornerstone of any
democratic society. Yet it is something that often is taken for granted.
Instead of merely quoting some text that highlights the point of the
judiciary's importance, allow me to share with you a personal
experience. As a human rights lawyer, I represented families in
Honduras whose fathers had disappeared. Theywere important cases,
one of which was the first case brought to the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights. Understandably, when we met with the families,
they were very emotional. They often would cry when speaking of
their loved ones who had disappeared. We were very concerned
about what would happen during the first open hearing before the
court. I was surprised, however, to see that the families were very
calm and serene in testifying. After the hearing, they told me why
they had been so calm. They said, "It is the first time that we are
being heard." For the first time after many years, they were in the
presence of independent and impartial judges. This event had
restored their faith in the rule of law and in the importance of the
judiciary. Indeed, I think it gave them faith in humanity.
I am sure that your discussion tonight will further enhance our
faith in and understanding of the importance of an independent and
impartial judiciary. Although the term "independent" is difficult to
define, as it is a very complex concept, an essential component of it
is the need for a permanent and informed process of open discussion
and debate, such as the one we will have here tonight.
Finally, I am very pleased to introduce Professor Ira Robbins, my
colleague, without whose assistance this program would not be
possible. Professor Robbins is the Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and
Professor of Law andJustice at the Washington College of Law, where
he teaches in the areas of Criminal Law, Post-Conviction Remedies,
Conflict of Laws, and Judicial Administration. He has also written
many books and law review articles and was selected Teacher of the
Year at American University in 1985 and University Teacher/Scholar
of the Year in 1987. Professor Robbins has served as the Acting
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Director of the Education and Training Division of the Federal
Judicial Center, and regularly provides training sessions for both
federal and state judges. I now will turn the program over to
Professor Robbins.
Thank you very much.
(Applause)
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you very much Dean Grossman.
I appreciate the wonderful introduction.
It has been said that the federal judiciary is facing a crisis of
volume.' The recently issued Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts2-the first long-range plan ever for the federal judicia-
ry-predicts that, based on current case filing rates, in twenty-five
years we will need four times as many judges as we now have to meet
the ever-mounting caseload.3 That would mean that more than 3000
federal judges would have to be appointed in the next 300 months.
Is that realistic? How would this growth affect the quality ofjustice in
the United States? Instead of increasing the number of judges,
should we amend jurisdictional statutes to reduce the number of
cases? Alternatively, should we concentrate on developing more
efficient case-management techniques? Put differently, do we truly
need structural change; or can we not only survive, but also thrive,
with creative fine-tuning? These are some of the issues that we will
address in the Washington College of Law's Centennial Symposium
on "The Future of the Federal Courts." In short, we will discuss the
broad question of reforming the federal courts so that they can
continue to serve the nation as the judiciary enters its third century
of service.
Without further ado, ladies and gentlemen, distinguished members
of our panel and of our audience, it is a grand understatement to say
that I am honored and delighted to present our keynote speaker, an
1. SeeJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 9-10 (1995) (hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN] ("Huge burdens are now being placed on
the federal courts.... [C]ivil case filings [in the district courts] have increased 1,424%, with
most of that growth in the period since 1960. Most remarkably, since 1904 annual cases
commenced in the federal appeals courts have increased more than 3,800%."); see also id. app.
A (discussing current caseload of federal district and circuit courts and forecasting future trends
in volume).
2. The Long Range Plan is the product of ChiefJustice Rehnquist's "recognition that the
judiciary needs a permanent and sustained planning effort." I. at vii. It is the "first
comprehensive plan for the future of the federal courts." IkL at 1.
3. See id. at 18 (stating that if Appendix A, entitled "Current Trends and Projections," is
accurate, "more than 4,000 federal judges might be necessary to handle the federal courts'
docket in 2020"); id app. A, tbl. 1, at 161 (speculating that in 2020, there may be 2410 district
judges and 1660 appellate judges).
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individual who truly needs no introduction, the Honorable William H.
Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States.
(Applause)
CHIEFJUSnCE WAIJAM H. REHNQUIST:
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
It is a great pleasure to be here this evening and to participate in
American University's celebration of the Centennial of the Washing-
ton College of Law. Since the federal judiciary celebrated its bi-
centennial only a few years ago, this is an appropriate occasion to
speak about the future of the federal courts. But I think it will be
helpful in trying to forecast the future of the federal courts to look
briefly at how they have evolved over the more than two hundred
years they have already been in existence.
The federal court-system in the United States got off to a remark-
ably slow start two hundred years ago. The Supreme Court ruled
quite early in the game that there were no common-law crimes in the
federal courts and, therefore, no criminal prosecutions could be
initiated unless authorized by an act of Congress criminalizing certain
conduct, and Congress simply did not pass many criminal statutes.
The federal trial courts had no "federal question" jurisdiction until
1875. This meant that if an individual wished to bring a lawsuit
claiming that a right secured to him by the Federal Constitution had
been violated, that lawsuit had to be brought in state court. The
Supreme Court of the United States could review a decision by the
highest court of a state that decided a federal question, but the lower
federal courts were not involved. Thus, for nearly the first century of
their existence, the staple of the business of the lower federal courts
was admiralty cases and cases in which jurisdiction was based on
diversity of citizenship.
But this distribution of business between the state court systems and
the federal courts changed quite dramatically after the Civil War. In
the aftermath of that conflict, the so-called Civil War amendments to
the Constitution were adopted, and of those the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has been a prolific source ofjudicial business. In 1875, federal
district courts were given federal question jurisdiction, so that from
then on, cases involving constitutional claims could be initiated in the
federal courts. Finally, the public's view of the appropriate role for
the federal government changed after the Civil War. Although the
change moved in fits and starts at first, it inexorably moved in the
direction of greater federal regulation of the citizenry. Until well
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after the Civil War, the general view was that the federal government
should provide for the common defense, coin money, carry the mails,
and pay for itself by collecting customs duties. But the increasing
pace of the Industrial Revolution, the rapid spread of the railroad
into every nook and cranny of the nation, and the increasing size of
manufacturing enterprises all provoked calls for regulation of what
was increasingly a commerce which paid scant attention to state
borders.
Before the turn of the twentieth century, Congress passed the
Interstate Commerce Act, giving a federal commission some control
over railroad rates and practices, and the Sherman Antitrust Act,
forbidding conspiracies in restraint of trade. As we moved into the
twentieth century, the inventions of the automobile and the airplane
continued the transportation revolution. The pace of increase in
federal regulation continued, driven partly by the interstate nature of
so much of the country's business and partly by a number of reform
movements seeking to ameliorate the plight of those who did not
share in the generally rising tide of prosperity. The typical pattern
was for reform movements to originate in the states, only to discover
that the practices which they sought to prohibit or limit could not be
prohibited or limited to their satisfaction without the intervention of
the federal government.
First came concern about wages, hours, and child labor in factories.
States adopted maximum hour and minimum wage laws, and laws
prohibiting child labor. But as often as not, the manufacturing plants
which would be affected by these laws would pick up and move to a
state which did not have such laws. Congress, viewing this phenome-
non with dismay, finally itself enacted federal prohibitions against
child labor and later a federal maximum hour and minimum wage
law. This pattern has continued in various areas of the law. A wave
of reform led to the enactment by the states of "blue sky" laws in the
first part of this century, regulating the issuance and selling of stock
and punishing fraud. But these laws were deemed inadequate, and
the federal government stepped in as a part of President Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal to enact federal regulations in that field. In the
1950s, many states enacted fair employment practice laws and anti-
discrimination laws governing public accommodations and the like.
But some states chose not to enact such laws, and dissatisfied
reformers went to Congress to nationalize this field of lawmaking.
The result was the federal Civil Rights laws enacted in the 1960s, and
every one of these laws was a source of added business for the federal
courts.
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The wave of federal regulatory statutes also brings with it related
problems that give rise to legal disputes. First, disputes arise as to
whether an agency or commission that is empowered to issue
regulations under a statute has exceeded its authority with respect to
one or more particular regulations. Federal courts must decide these
questions, as well as basic questions of statutory interpretation.
Second, because of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, every
time Congress enacts a new statute dealing with some phase of the
economy, it very likely supersedes some of the laws of the various
states which previously governed that area. For example, in 1974
Congress enacted the modestly titled Employees Retirement Income
Security Act, which had as its basic purpose the introduction of some
federal supervision over employer plans to provide various health and
retirement benefits to employees. In the twenty-two years in which
the statute has been on the books, our Court has decided twenty-one
cases involving the question of whether or not that federal law
preempted a particular state law dealing with this same general
subject matter. And that, of course, is only the tip of the iceberg; if
the Supreme Court has decided that number of cases, the federal
appeals courts have decided fifteen or twenty times that number of
cases dealing with preemption under this one particular federal
statute.
The result of this two-hundred-year evolution has been that
although ninety-five percent of the judicial business in the United
States is still transacted in state courts, there has been a remarkable
increase in the business of the federal courts because of these changes
which I have described. And the federal courts are now awash in the
most recent of these changes, which is the federalization of more and
more crimes which once were thought to be matters of exclusive
concern to the states.
More than forty years ago when I began the practice of law in
Arizona, there were not many federal criminal statutes on the books.
The staple of the criminal business of federal courts outside of the
metropolitan areas was prosecutions for transporting a stolen car in
interstate commerce, using the mails for interstate communications
to commit fraud, and a very few similar crimes.
But that landscape has entirely changed in the last generation.
Congress, understandably concerned with the increasing traffic of
drugs and the violence resulting from the use of guns, has legislated
again and again to make what once were only state crimes federal
offenses. The same sort of dissatisfaction with state treatment of the
cases in this area of the law has been obtained as earlier was obtained
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with welfare legislation and civil rights laws. Congress has been of the
opinion that even though these gun and drug crimes could be
prosecuted under state law, the state penal systems were too lenient
in paroling serious offenders after having served only a fraction of the
time to which they were sentenced. So Congress stepped in,
prescribed very severe sentencing guidelines for federal crimes, and
federalized countless crimes involving drugs and guns.
All of this means that in talking about the future of the federal
courts, we must understand that Congress probably will continue to
enact new legislation that provides new causes of action for litigants
on the civil side of the docket and new federal crimes to be prosecut-
ed on the criminal side of the docket.
It is the federal district courts and the courts of appeals that are
being hit hardest by this ever-increasing wave of litigation. The
Supreme Court's docket is actually down from what it was several
years ago. With the district courts, it is largely a question of having
enough judicial manpower to adjudicate the incoming cases. The
same is true to a large extent of the courts of appeals, except that
indefinite enlargement of the number of judges on the courts of
appeals poses problems of collegiality, maintaining a coherent body
of law in the circuit, and the like. The majority of federal judges, if
the Judicial Conference of the United States accurately reflects their
views, thinks that the federal judiciary should remain a limited and
somewhat specialized system of administering justice.
Possible alternatives to indefinite enlargement of the courts of
appeals would be the creation of specialized appellate courts for a
particular subject matter, restriction of jurisdiction as Professor
Robbins suggested, or the limitation of the automatic right of appeal
from district courts to the courts of appeals. We have on our panel
tonight two distinguished judges of the courts of appeals, Judge
Reinhardt andJudge Becker, and a distinguished district courtjudge,
Judge Barker, who can discuss these aspects of the federal courts
more knowledgeably than I can.
It would be a mistake to think that just because a certain kind of
judicial business has always been conducted in a particular way in the
past, it therefore should be conducted that way in the future. The
federal courts, like other governmental institutions, must, when
necessary, change with the changing times. A Long Range Planning
Committee of the Judicial Conference, of which both Judges Becker
and Barker were members, has recently peered into the future and
come up with a number of recommendations for how the federal
judiciary can cope with the changes that the future will assuredly
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bring. But all of the planning and discussion by judges as to the
future of the federal judiciary has a somewhat tentative, conditional
air about it: in this area we are not masters in our own house, and
any major change will have to be approved by Congress.
I have said that the judiciary must change with the changing times.
But there are a very few essentials that are vital to the functioning of
the federal court system as we know it. Surely one of these essentials
is the independence of the judges who sit on these courts, as Dean
Grossman commented.
Article III of the Constitution guarantees to federal judges the right
to continue in office during good behavior and prohibits the
diminution of their compensation. But these two constitutional
provisions did not settle every question about the independence of
the judiciary. As a result, several actions by Congress over the years
have fleshed out the constitutional provision in a manner akin to the
development of the "unwritten constitution" in Great Britain.
Article I of the Constitution provides that civil officers, including
judges, may be impeached by the House of Representatives for "high
crimes and misdemeanors," and if convicted by the Senate, may be
removed from office. The term "high crimes and misdemeanors" was
sufficiently amorphous to leave open the possibility, at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, that a federal judge could be removed
from office not only for conduct that was criminal, but also for rulings
from the bench that seemed flagrantly wrong.
But an important episode early in our nation's history effectively
resolved this question. This was the impeachment trial of Justice
Samuel Chase, then an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, in
1805. Chase had been appointed to the Supreme Court by George
Washington in 1796, but in those days the Supreme Court docket was
even lighter than it is today; Supreme Court justices spent most of
theirjudicial time riding the circuit, trying lawsuits in tandem with the
resident judge. Chase was an interesting fellow. He was a striking
figure physically-over six feet tall, with a ruddy complexion which
earned him the sobriquet, behind his back of course, of "Old Bacon
Face." He was able but imperious, and totally lacking in the patience
necessary for a trial judge.
Two years after Thomas Jefferson took office as President in 1803,
Chase delivered a partisan charge to a grand jury in Baltimore.
Jefferson, learning of this, wrote to his lieutenants in the House of
Representatives suggesting that they do something about it. The
House proceeded to impeach Chase on a number of counts. The first
count was the charge to the Baltimore grandjury. Other counts were
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based on his conduct in the trial of John Fries for treason in
Philadelphia in 1800, and still others were based on his conduct in
the trial ofJames Callender in Richmond for violation of the Sedition
Act in that same year. Chase's trial before the Senate began in
February 1805, and it was presided over by the Vice President, Aaron
Burr. Burr himself was a fugitive from justice at this time, having
killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel at Weehawken, New Jersey, the
preceding summer. Criminal indictments were out for him in both
New Jersey and New York, which caused one wag to remark that
whereas in most courts the criminal was arraigned before the judge,
in this court the judge was arraigned before the criminal.
More than fifty witnesses testified before the Senate. The charges
pertaining to the Fries trial did not amount to much. At the most,
they showed Chase to be headstrong and somewhat domineering, a
trait not unknown in other federal judges either then or now. The
charges in connection with the Callender trial were a good deal more
serious. Callender was charged under the Sedition Act with bringing
President John Adams into disrepute, inasmuch as he called him a
toady to British interests in a long and incredibly turgid book entitled
The Prospect Before Us. The evidence showed that Chase had actually
taken the book with him from Baltimore, where he lived, to Rich-
mond in order to allow the grand jury to consider it, and that during
the stagecoach trip from Baltimore to Richmond he referred to
Callender as a "scoundrel" to another passenger. In his defense, it
may be said that in those days it took four days to travel in a stage-
coach from Baltimore to Richmond, and you presumably had to talk
about something with your fellow passengers.
After all the evidence was in on March 1, 1805, the Senate
convened to vote on the articles of impeachment against Chase. At
that time, there were thirty-four senators, twenty-five of whom were
Jeffersonian Republicans. If these senators voted a party line, there
would be the necessary two-thirds majority to convict Chase and
remove him from office. Happily, they broke ranks on this question.
On the articles based on the Fries trial, the vote was sixteen to convict
and eighteen to acquit. The vote on the articles relating to the
Callender trial was eighteen to convict and sixteen for acquittal. On
the count based on the Baltimore grand jury charge, the House
managers came closest to prevailing; nineteen senators voted guilty,
and fifteen voted not guilty. But even this number fell four votes
short of the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution, and
Chase therefore was acquitted on all of the counts against him.
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This decision by the Senate was enormously important in securing
the kind of judicial independence contemplated by Article III.
Coming only two years after the seminal decision of the Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison, it coupled with the authority of the
federal courts to declare legislative acts unconstitutional the assurance
to federal judges that their judicial acts-their rulings from the
bench-would not be a basis for removal from office by impeachment
and conviction. And that has been the guiding principle of the
House of Representatives and the Senate from that day to this; federal
judges have been impeached and convicted-happily, only a very
few-but it has been for criminal conduct such as tax evasion, perjury,
and the like.
This principle only goes so far. It obviously does not mean that
federal judges should not be criticized for the decisions which they
make; they are frequently so criticized by the media and by law
reviews, and there is certainly no reason why other citizens should not
engage in the same practice. And the doctrine of judicial indepen-
dence does not mean that the country will be forever in sway to
groups of non-elected judges. When vacancies occur through death
or retirement on any of the federal courts, replacements are nominat-
ed by the President, who has been elected by the people of the entire
nation, and subject to confirmation by the Senate, whose members
have been elected by the people of their respective states. Both the
President and the Senate have felt free to take into consideration the
likely judicial philosophy of any nominee to the federal courts. Thus,
there is indirect popular input into the selection of federal judges.
This principle is perhaps best illustrated by President Franklin
Roosevelt's experiences with appointments to the Supreme Court.
Dissatisfied with the decisions of that Court which invalidated some
provisions of his New Deal program, he asked Congress to enact what
soon became known as a "court-packing plan," which would have
allowed him to replace any Justice over seventy who did not retire
with an additional Justice, up to the number of fifteen. This rather
bold effort to change the philosophy of the Court was rejected by the
Senate in 1937. But although Roosevelt lost that battle, he eventually
won the war by serving three full terms as President and appointing
eight of the nine members of the Supreme Court. This simply shows
that there is a wrong way and a right way to go about putting a
popular imprint on the federal judiciary.
The framers of the United States Constitution came up with two
quite original ideas. The first was the idea of a chief executive who
was not responsible to the legislature, as a Chief Executive is under
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the parliamentary system. The second was the idea of an indepen-
dent judiciary with the authority to declare laws passed by Congress
unconstitutional. The first idea, a President not responsible to
Congress, has not been widely copied by other nations in the western
world when they have come to review their systems of government.
But the second idea, that of an independent judiciary with the final
authority to interpret a written constitution, has caught on with many
other nations, particularly since the end of the Second World War.
It is one of the crown jewels of our system of government today.
Change is the law of life, and the judiciary will have to change to
meet the challenges which will face it in the future. But the indepen-
dence of the federal judiciary is essential to its proper functioning and
must be retained.
Thank you very much.
(Applause)
PLENARY ACADEMIC PANEL:
THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you, Chief Justice Rehnquist, for
your important and provocative address. It is certain to have
important repercussions as certain corners of our society are question-
ing the independence of the judiciary.
We will continue our panel discussion from the bench rather than
from the podium. After all, when else in my lifetime will I get to sit
en banc with such an impressive panel?
(Laughter)
I do not want to use too much of our valuable time introducing our
speakers, but I do want you to know what an outstanding panel we
have convened to discuss the important and timely topic of the future
of the federal courts. I am delighted and honored that the nation's
true leaders on these issues will be addressing us this evening. I will
introduce all four of the panelists at this time, rather than before
each one speaks.
On my far right-I will refrain from making the obvious political
joke at this point-
(Laughter)
On my far right is the Honorable Edward R. Becker, Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge Becker
is a former federal district judge, having served on the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania from 1970 to
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1981, when President Reagan appointed Judge Becker to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Judge Becker has written in many areas, including complex
litigation, federal sentencing guidelines, evidence, antitrust law, and
law and economics. Judge Becker has served as chairman of the
Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Criminal Law
and Probation Administration. Significantly, for tonight's purposes,
Judge Becker was a member of the Long Range Planning Committee
of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
Lawyers who have evaluated Judge Becker over the years have
written many interesting comments. One wrote, "He's the star of the
Third Circuit." Another wrote, "He asks fascinating questions,
whether you think they relate to the case or not."
(Laughter)
Yet another wrote, "His only problem is that he tries to write the
definitive law review article with each opinion." Judge Becker, if the
lawyers on the Third Circuit don't want your opinions, we would be
happy to publish them in one of our four law journals.
I should say that, when I was a law clerk at the Second Circuit some
twenty-three years ago, Judge Becker was the talk of the courthouse
among judges and law clerks alike. One notable story regarding the
judge comes from early in his career when, as a federal districtjudge,
he was confronted with a motion to dismiss. The arguments for both
sides, for whatever reason, had been written in verse. Judge Becker,
not one to shy away from creative challenges, wrote his entire
opinion-including headnotes and footnotes-as a poem.' Welcome,
Judge Becker.
(Applause)
To my immediate right is the Honorable Stephen Reinhardt, Judge
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. After an
already distinguished career that included law firm practice and
serving as president of the Los Angeles Police Commission, Judge
Reinhardt was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit in 1980 by President Carter. Judge Reinhardt also
served as Secretary of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics Organizing
Committee. In 1987, the California Trial Lawyers Association voted
Judge Reinhardt the Appellate Judge of the Year.
I'm sure that many of you have read about Judge Reinhardt
recently. Last month, he authored a 109-page ruling striking down a
Washington-state ban on assisted suicide, the first such ruling by a
4. Mackensworth v. American Trading Transp. Co., 367 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
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federal appeals court 5 Judge Reinhardt wrote for the 8-3 majority of
his en banc court that "[t]here is a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in determining the time and manner of one's own death."'
Perhaps we will see that case go on to the High Court. Indeed, just
two weeks ago, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in two of Judge
Reinhardt's cases.7
JUDGE REINHARDT: That is an average week.
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Let's see, fifty-two weeks, two a week, the
Supreme Court takes about 100 cases a year-they are all yours.
JUDGE REINHARDT: It does seem that way.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: In one of those two cases, Judge
Reinhardt ruled that an English-only provision of the Arizona
Constitution that generally prohibited use of any other language by
officers and employees of the state while performing their official acts
violated the First Amendment.8
In addition to his work on the Ninth Circuit, Judge Reinhardt has
written numerous articles on civil rights, the death penalty, and the
purposes and future of the federal courts. Judge Reinhardt, I
welcome you.
(Applause)
To my immediate left is the Honorable Sarah Evans Barker. Prior
to her appointment to the bench, Judge Barker was the United States
Attorney for the Southern District of Indiana. In 1984, President
Reagan appointed Judge Barker to serve on the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana. OnJanuary 1, 1994,Judge
Barker became ChiefJudge of that court.
Like Judge Becker, Judge Barker also served as a member of the
Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States.9 In addition, Judge Barker has served as a member of
the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference.
Among her noteworthy decisions was one in which she ruled that
a newly enacted Indianapolis ordinance regulating pornography,
however laudable the City Council's efforts were to protect the rights
5. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct.
37 (1996).
6. Id. at 793.
7. SeeYuiguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted
sub noam. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996); Bennett v. Plenert,
63 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
8. See Yuiguez, 69 F.3d at 923.
9. See infra note 12 (listing members of Long Range Planning Committee).
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of women, was unconstitutional and violated, the First Amendment.1"
Judge Barker has also ruled that an Indiana law prohibiting write-in
votes on election ballots violated the First Amendment free speech
and association rights of the voter."
When Judge Barker was sworn in as a Federal District Judge in
March 1984, she remarked, "When ajudge is sworn in, it is one more
ongoing step in the process ofjustice, a process that is never finished.
I sense an awareness of the awesome task before me. I will try to be
a person of courage and compassion-honest, fair, and incorruptible."
These are characteristics thatJudge Barker no doubt acquired as a law
student, for I am proud to say that Chief Judge Barker is an alumna
of the Washington College of Law. Judge Barker, I welcome you.
(Applause)
To my far left is Professor Charles W. Nihan. Professor Nihan has
served as Deputy Director of the Federal Judicial Center, first
appointed by Chief Justice Burger in 1981, and subsequently reap-
pointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1986.
In 1991, he was named head of the Long Range Planning Office of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, assisting the
Long Range Planning Committee in preparing the first comprehen-
sive plan to guide the future development, administration, and
jurisdiction of the federal court system. Professor Nihan has also
served as a member of the Administrative Conference of the United
States. Professor Nihan is a member of our adjunct faculty, currently
teaching our course in Judicial Administration. He has also written
extensively in that area.
In 1991, when Professor Nihan left the Federal Judicial Center, a
resolution signed by the members of the Board of the Center,
including Chief Justice Rehnquist, noted Professor Nihan's "broad
understanding of the federal courts [and] his ability to think beyond
accepted and standard practices to envision new approaches." Three
years later when he retired from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, its Director, Ralph Meachum, stated, "Chuck
Nihan's term was marked by extraordinary, if not unprecedented,
achievement and accomplishment." Professor Nihan, welcome.
(Applause)
As you can see, we have quite a distinguished panel of experts on
many subjects. We have judges with the combined experience of
seventy-six years on the bench, and almost as much in judicial
10. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
11. See Paul v. Indiana Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
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administration. I would be remiss if I failed to mention that not only
are our panelists truly outstanding, but we also are privileged to have
a rather distinguished audience, including federal, state, and local
trial and appellate judges; representatives from the Federal Judicial
Center, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and the
American Bar Association; faculty from other law schools in the
Washington, D.C., vicinity and beyond; and, of course, members of
our student body, staff, alumni, and faculty.
We shall now hear the panel's views on what is in store, or what
should be in store, for the federal courts. I have asked each panelist
to present her or his views in fifteen minutes. We will then allow the
panelists to question one another and to receive questions from the
audience as well. Judge Becker, I turn the floor over to you.
JUDGE BECKER: This evening's panel has been asked to explore
a daunting list of questions: whether the concept ofjudicial federal-
ism can be maintained as federal jurisdiction continues to expand
rapidly; whether the significant and steady increase in the size of the
federal judiciary since 1960 threatens the stability and coherence of
national law; whether the structure of the federal judiciary is inappro-
priate for its workload; whether recent procedural innovations
designed to deal with the crushing circuit and district caseload are
changing the character of federal justice; and whether the federal
judiciary truly is a co-equal branch of national government that has
the ability to plan for and control its own future. What I will do is
give you my quick answers to these questions and then talk in some
depth about the size and structure of the federal judiciary, particularly
the federal appellate judiciary.
Turning first to the quick answers, let me take up the last question
first because it is the easiest to address. Is the federal judiciary truly
a co-equal branch of the national government that is capable of
effectively planning for and controlling its future? The answer is no.
The Long Range Planning Committee 2 on which I served, started
12. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 165-66 (stating that in 1990, Federal Courts
Study Committee created the Committee on Long Range Planning which "represents the
beginning ofjudiciary-wide long range planning process"). The Committee on Long Range
Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States consists of: Judge Otto R. Skopil,Jr.
(Chairman), U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit;Judge Sarah Evans Barker, U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Indiana; Judge Edward R. Becker, U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit;
Judge Wilfred Feinberg, U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Judge Elmo B. Hunter, U.S.
District Court, Western District of Missouri; Judge James Lawrence King, U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Florida; Judge Virginia M. Morgan, Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of
Michigan; Judge A. Thomas Small, BankruptcyJudge, Eastern District of North Carolina; and
Judge Harlington Wood, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. See id. at 175-77.
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its work by studying the planning process.' 3 We learned that we
were different from most other organizations that engaged in strategic
or long-range planning. Most organizations are hierarchical; meaning
an organization with a boss. These are organizations that have
control over their own operations and businesses. The federal
judiciary is not hierarchical. The Chief Justice is not our boss. The
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is not anybody's boss. This
country's federal judges are independent and pretty much govern
themselves.
Nor do the federal courts have any control over their business.
Who controls our business? Congress. Congress fixes our jurisdic-
tion; it also fixes our budget. 4 The lawyers, including those in the
Executive Branch, decide what cases are brought before us.'5
Now, my answers to the second, third, and fourth questions are
more tentative. The questions are: whether the significant and steady
increase in the size of the federal judiciary since 1960 threatens the
stability and coherence of national law; whether the structure of the
federal judiciary is inappropriate for its workload; and whether recent
procedural innovations are changing the character of federal justice.
The answers to these questions are related to the problem of
answering the question whether the concept ofjudicial federalism can
be maintained as federal jurisdiction continues to expand rapidly.
That depends on how far federal jurisdiction will continue to expand.
Who knows? The question is, what will the future bring? The Chief
Justice has stated that the Long Range Planning Committee peered
into the future. a6 Well, we peered into the future as best we could,
but we do not have any crystal balls, at least no more than anyone else
does.
The projections of a quadrupling federal caseload in twenty-five
years are quite scary.17 No one, however, knows whether they will
13. See id. app. B (discussing Committee's long range planning process; setting forth
Committee's approach to defining the role of the federal courts; and outlining, chronologically,
the steps and procedures taken by the committee in developing the Long Range Plan).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress authority to create federal courts);
id. art. III, §§ 1-2 (providing Congress with wide latitude to definejurisdiction of federal courts);
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 2 ("Congress sets the courts' budgets and the scope of
federal jurisdiction . ").
15. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 2 ("[T]he executive branch determines the
government's prosecutorial and civil litigation strategies that have substantial impact on the
courts' workload.").
16. See Keynote Address, supra pp. 270-71.
17. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 129 (outlining possible court statistics of four-
fold increase over present-day conditions); id. at 18 (stating that if Plan's caseload andjudgeship
projections are accurate, "more than 4,000 federal judges might be necessary to handle the
federal courts' docket in 2020"); i. at 9-16 (discussing historical and projected caseloads of
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come to pass. There already are some contrary signs. There has
been some slowing in the growth of the federal caseload; the criminal
caseload is down a bit in the district courts."' The pro se cases are
up, 9 but so is the entire volume of cases in the courts of appeals.2 °
Most of the volume, however, is an increase in pro se cases which are
easier to handle.
There also seems to be some awareness in Congress of our plight.
Witness the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,21 which
is designed, among other things, to cut back on federal court
litigation.22 I, however, submit that there is a new factor, a new kid
on the block, the Long Range Plan.23 Perhaps the federal judiciary
cannot control its future, but through the Long Range Plan, we can
influence it.
Let me talk briefly about the Long Range Plan and particularly its
approach to issues of size and structure. The Long Range Plan
contemplates a future in which the federal courts are able to conserve
what the Plan defines as their core values: the rule of law, equal
justice, judicial independence, limited jurisdiction, excellence,
accountability, and yet the flexibility to respond to new challenges. 24
The Long Range Planning Committee was aware of these scary
predictions about the increase in the caseload.25 It might have
responded in a number of ways. It might have adopted a pliant
attitude toward proposals for a substantial increase in the size of the
federal judiciary to 2000 or 3000 judges. There are now about 840
active judges.26 Alternatively, the Committee might have responded
district courts and courts of appeals).
18. See id. at 12. The Long Range Plan states: "In 1972, criminal case filings represented
one-third of total filings in district courts and criminal trials accounted for 40 percent of all
trials. In 1994 criminal filings were only 13 percent of all filings, but 42 percent of all trials."
Id.
19. See id. at 63 n.14 ("In the district courts, prisoner petition filings increased in 71 of 94
districts between 1994 and 1995; approximately 62,000 prisoner petitions, or 26% of all civil
filings, were filed in the year endingJune 30, 1995.").
20. See id. at 15 tbl. 4. Table 4 sets forth the historical, present, and projected number of
appeals filed annually in the courts of appeals. In 1980, 23,200 total appeals were filed in the
courts of appeals. That number nearly doubled by 1990, jumping to 40,898. By 1995, the
number of criminal appeals filed in federal courts increased by almost 10,000, rising to 49,671.
See id.
21. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and
18 U.S.C.).
22. See id. tit. I (Reduction of Abusive Litigation).
23. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1.
24. See id. at vii.
25. See id. at 15 tbUs. 3, 4 (setting forth historical and projected numbers of cases filed in
district courts and courts of appeals from 1940 to 2020); see also id. at 17-20 (discussing possible
scenarios for future of federal courts if caseload projections are accurate); id. at 12940
(suggesting ways of dealing with hypothetical "daunting" scenario).
26. See id. at 16 tbl. 6 (positing that there were 816 total federal judgeships in 1995).
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favorably to those on the other end of the spectrum who propose a
cap on judicial personnel. The Committee, however, adopted a
middle ground-a policy of carefully controlled growth in the Article
III judiciary.27
The size of ajudicial institution is largely dependent on the breadth
of its jurisdiction. The Long Range Plan seeks to define the appropri-
ate scope of federal court jurisdiction according to a principle of
judicial federalism that maintains state courts as appropriate forums
for dispute resolution absent a clearly established need for a federal
judicial forum.23  To implement this provision, the Plan recommends
that Congress define and maintain a limited federal jurisdiction. 9
Long Range Plan Recommendations Two and Three, which address
criminal jurisdiction," and Recommendations Six and Seven, which
27. See id. at 38 rec. 15 (recommending carefully controlled growth in Article IIIjudiciary
"so that the creation of new judgeships, while not subject to a numerical ceiling, is limited to
that number necessary to exercise federal court jurisdiction").
28. See id. at 21-39. Chapter 4 of the Long Range Plan, entitled 'Judicial Federalism,"
discusses the appropriate relationship between state and federal courts such that courts may
deliver the highest quality ofjustice. See id
29. See id. at 23 rec. 1. Recommendation One of the Long Range Plan states:
Congress should be encouraged to conserve the federal courts as a distinctive judicial
forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism. Civil and criminal
jurisdiction should be assigned to the federal courts only to further clearly defined and
justified national interests, leaving to the state courts the responsibility for adjudicating
all other matters.
I&
30. See id. at 24-26 recs. 2, 3. Recommendation Two states, "In principle, criminal activity
should be prosecuted in a federal court only in those instances in which state court prosecution
is not appropriate or where federal interests are paramount." Id. at 24 rec. 2. The Recommen-
dation also delineates five types of offenses for which Congress should be encouraged to allocate
criminal jurisdiction to the federal courts: (1) offenses against the federal government or its
inherent interests; (2) criminal activity with substantial multistate or international aspects;
(3) criminal activity involving complex commercial or institutional enterprises most effectively
prosecuted using federal resources or expertise; (4) serious, high-level or widespread state or
local government corruption; and (5) criminal cases raising highly sensitive local issues. See id.
at 24-25 rec. 2(a)-(e).
Recommendation Three encourages Congress "to review existingfederal criminal statutes with
the goal of eliminating provisions no longer serving an essential federal purpose." Id. at 25 rec.
3. Such a review should include both a major overhaul of the existing federal criminal code "so
that it conforms to the principles set forth in Recommendation 2," as well as the utilization of
"sunset" provisions that would "require periodic reevaluation of the purpose and need for any
new federal offenses that may be created." Id; see also id. at 26 rec. 4 (encouraging Congress
and executive branch to work with states to develop policy for determining "whether offenses
should be prosecuted in the federal or state systems.").
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address civil jurisdiction,3 define the contours of such a limited
jurisdiction.
In Chapter Four of the Long Range Plan, the Committee warns
against either a single national court system or two systems, the state
and federal courts, engaged in "identical business."32  The Long
Range Plan, in seeking to preserve the core values of the federal
courts33 and to allow state courts to "remain[] vital and efficient
forums to adjudicate matters that belong there in the light of history
and a sound division of authority,"' makes Recommendations to
achieve this goal. The Plan recommends extended and improved
interbranch coordination, cooperation, and communication between
state and federal court systems, as well as strengthening of state justice
systems with federal financial assistance." Will these proposals work,
by which I mean, will Congress respond? We must wait and see, but
we are optimistic.
In response to the interim predictions or projections of caseload
growth, the Long Range Planning Committee might have adopted,
but did not, several proposals for major changes in the structure of
the federal appellate judiciary: the discretionary appellate review of
all or of a specified category of cases; the establishment of an
31. See id. at 28-32 recs. 6, 7. Recommendation Six suggests that Congress "exercise
restraint in the enactment of new statutes that assign civil jurisdiction to the federal courts and
should do so only to further clearly defined and justified federal interests." Id. at 28 rec. 6.
According to the Long Range Plan, federal court jurisdiction should extend only to civil matters
that: "(a) arise under the United States Constitution; (b) deserve adjudication in a federal
judicial forum because the issues presented cannot be dealt with satisfactorily at the state level
and involve either (1) a strong need for uniformity or (2) paramount federal interests;
(c) involve the foreign relations of the United States; (d) involve the federal government,
federal officials, or agencies as plaintiffs or defendants; (e) involve disputes between or among
the states; and (f) affect substantial interstate or international disputes." Id. at 28-29 rec. 6(a)-
(f).
Recommendation Seven encourages Congress to reduce the number of federal court
proceedings based on diversity jurisdiction by: (1) "eliminating diversity jurisdiction for cases
in which the plaintiff is a citizen of the state in which the federal district court is located," id.
at 30 rec. 7(a); (2) "amending the statutes conferring original and removal jurisdiction on the
district courts in diversity actions to require that parties invoking diversity jurisdiction plead
specific facts showing that the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirement has been
satisfied," id. at 30 rec. 7(b) (1); (3) "raising the amount-in-controversy level and indexing the
new floor amount to the rate of inflation," id. at 30 rec. 7(b)(2); and (4) "exclud[ing] punitive
damages from the calculation of the amount in controversy," id. at 30 rec. 7(b) (3).
32. See id. at 22 (recommending development of "cooperative federalism in which the
federal government and the states work together to promote effective civil and criminal justice
systems").
33. See id. at 7-9. The Long Range Plan states that the "core values" of the FederalJudiciary
are the rule of law, equal justice,judicial independence, national courts of limited jurisdiction,
excellence, and accountability. See id. at 7.
34. See id. at 22 (discussingjudicial federalism).
35. See id. (asserting that to attain goal ofjudicial federalism, state justice systems must be
improved and that doing so "may require significant federal financial assistance to state courts,
prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies").
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intermediate tier of appellate courts such as a District Court Appellate
Panel; the creation of specialized appellate courts; and the compre-
hensive redrawing ofjudicial circuits. 6 These proposals, and propos-
als like them, have been rejected, and will continue to be rejected,
unless what the Plan describes as a "nightmare scenario" imperils the
federal courts."7 The "nightmare scenario" is a hypothetical situation
in which the workload of the federal courts goes through the roof.8
This description of the Long Range Plan suggests that the Commit-
tee on Long Range Planning felt the federal judicial system, as
presently constituted, is a national treasure-one capable of accom-
modating present and future caseload growth, and hence, one that
should not be changed drastically. The Long Range Plan is ajudicious
plan, not a radical one, although it does discuss options for major
revision under the alternative future or "nightmare scenario" that I
described. 9
I propose to defend the Plan's effort to control the size and to
preserve the present structure of the federal judiciary as a whole and
the federal appellate judiciary in particular.
I will make several points. First, I defend the view taken by the Plan
that we cannot tolerate extreme growth in the size of the federal
judiciary. In my view, a radical increase in the size of the federal
judiciary will lessen its quality and diminish one of the jewels in the
crown of the Republic. It is not that there are not thousands of
lawyers in the nation who could do the job as well as I and my
colleagues; there surely are. The problem is that when the size of the
bench is very large, it becomes easy for the political process to
appoint candidates of mediocre or even marginal competence.
Conversely, when an appointment is of high visibility, the selection
will be of high quality. All who have been in politics-and that
includes myself-have seen this phenomenon firsthand. It really
happens, and yet we cannot afford to have it happen to the federal
judiciary. The Plan thus advocates that the growth of Article III
judiciary should be controlled carefully so that the creation of new
36. See id. at 46 (rejecting proposals that would consolidate existing circuits, create
additional appellate structures, or allow Supreme Court to refer cases that involve circuit
conflicts to a circuit not involved in the legal dispute).
37. See id. (stating that Committee will reject proposals to improve resolution of intercircuit
conflict until "situation seriously worsens").
38. See it. at 18 (positing that projections outlined in Appendix A of Long Range Plan are
bleak and that ifjurisdiction "continues to grow at the same rate it did over the past 53 years,
the picture in 2020 can only be described as nightmarish").
39. See id.; see also id. at 17-20 (addressing question of how federal courts will operate 25
years from nowwhen, assuming projections in AppendixA of LongRangePlan are accurate, their
workload may quadruple).
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judgeships will not be subject to a numerical ceiling.4" The growth
of the federal judiciary must be limited to that number of judges
necessary to exercise federal court jurisdiction.41 I believe that to be
a sound provision.
Second, we must not let the size of the courts of appeal themselves
grow too large. AsJudgeJon Newman of the Second Circuit has put
it, if that Court of Appeals rose to fifty judges, "[i] t will not be a
court; it will be a stable of judges, each one called upon to plough
through the unrelenting volume harnessed on any given day with two
other judges who barely know each other."42 How large is too large?
That is a difficult question. Acknowledging that reasonable minds
may disagree about the extent to which a court of appeals may grow
without becoming ineffective, the Long Range Plan provides a
formula.43 In principle, each court of appeals should consist of a
number ofjudges sufficient to maintain the traditional access to and
excellence of federal appellate justice; to preserve judicial collegiality;
and to maintain the consistency, coherence, and quality of circuit
precedent.44
An appellate court, in this special sense, is not merely an adminis-
trative entity. An appellate court is a cohesive group of individuals
who are familiar with one another's ways of thinking, reacting,
persuading, and being persuaded. The court becomes an institution,
an incorporeal body of precedent, tradition, shared experiences, and
collegial feelings, whose members possess a common devotion to
mastering circuit law, maintaining its coherence and consistency, and
thus assuring its predictability in adjudicating cases in a like manner.
I commend this approach. In my view, it militates against the
creation of jumbo courts of appeals. The Plan's focus on the
responsibility of appellate courtjudges to maintain the coherence and
consistency of circuit law4" confirms this view. It contains the seeds
40. See id. at 44 ("[T]his plan does not suggest a fixed numerical limit to circuit size."); iU
(advocating "carefully controlled growth" of federal judiciary as method of preserving "sound
judicial federalism" and rejecting artificial limit on number of federal judges).
41. See id at 22 ("The appropriate size of the federal judiciary is necessarily a function of
its jurisdiction.").
42. Jon 0. Newman, 1,000Judges-The Limit for an Effective FederaIjudiciary, 76JUDICATURE
187 (1993).
43. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 44 rec. 17 ("Each court of appeals should
comprise a number ofjudges sufficient to maintain access to and excellence of federal appellate
justice.").
44. See id. at 44-45 (discussing preservation of distinct system of federal courts and
appropriateness of growth).
45. See id. at 7-8 (stating that "predictability, continuity and coherence of the law, the
visibility of the decision maker, and judges' acceptance of responsibility that law, rather than
personal preference, provides the basis for making decisions" are key features of rule of law,
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of an even more precise test, one that I fashioned from my own
experience of more than a quarter of a century on the federal bench
and over fourteen years on the Court of Appeals. It is as follows:
when it becomes impossible, or even too difficult, for each judge of
the court to have a personal familiarity with circuit law, the court is
too large and should be divided or realigned. To amplify, my court
is typical of many courts of appeals in following the practice of the
pre-filing circulation of all published opinions. 6 In other words, all
opinions that will constitute circuit precedent are submitted to all
members of the court before filing so that each judge can review the
circulating opinion to see if it is consistent with the fabric of circuit
law.
In the statistical year 1995, my court published 353 opinions,
covering some 8500 pages of typescript."U This is only a small
portion of the material we have to read every day. When this reading
is added to our manifold other duties of reading, writing, thinking,
conferring, and administering, it takes me seven days a week to do my
job. Reviewing that number of opinions approaches my limit.
During the same period, the Ninth Circuit, if I may use that court
to help frame the issue, published 927 opinions.48 There is no
record of the total number of pages, but it must be staggering. I
submit that there is no conceivable way that any judge of that court
can read, or even meaningfully scan and digest, anywhere near that
number of opinions so as to be abreast of circuit law. In other words,
the Ninth Circuit is already far too large. I should add that I am
unimpressed with the argument that administrative efficiencies and
the use of computers or staff attorneys to keep track of the law would
suffice. In the area of knowing circuit law and maintaining its
coherence and consistency, judges must do their own work.
The notion of the law of the circuit is not mere rhetoric. The
integrity of circuit law is essential to the predictability upon which
which is core value ofjudiciary that Long Range Plan is "dedicated to conserve and enhance");
see also id. at 44 rec. 17 (allowing circuit restructuring only if empirical evidence demonstrates
that circuit court is unable to deliver coherent and consistent law).
46. See SD Cia. R. 5.6.2 (requiring authoringjudge to circulate draft opinion "to other two
members of panel with a request for approval or suggestions they may desire to make with
respect to the draft opinion").
47. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES, STATISTICS DIVSION, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM
50 thl. S-3 (1995) [hereinafterjuDIcAL BUSINESS] (demonstrating that during 12-month period
ending Sept. 30, 1995, Third Circuit published 346 written and signed opinions and seven
written, reasoned, and unsigned opinions).
48. See id. (showing that during 12-month period ending Sept. 30, 1995, Ninth Circuit
published 909 written and signed opinions and 18 written, reasoned, and unsigned opinions).
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lawyers and litigants must rely in making important business and
personal decisions. Instability in circuit law creates unnecessary
litigation and results in high social costs. Instability results in the loss
of collegiality that inevitably occurs on jumbo courts. Collegiality, I
remind you, does not refer to social relations, but the intangible, yet
very real process of getting to know your colleagues and how they
think, of developing a relationship of trust and an ability to compro-
mise. Large appellate courts, in general, lack collegiality because of
the large number of panel combinations that they generate. The
number of combinations in the Ninth Circuit exceeds 3000, and if it
goes as large as they think it can go,49 it would exceed 25,000.
Therefore, my comments suggest that we must seriously reconsider,
notjust the division of some circuits, but perhaps a major realignment
of circuit structure and the creation of additional circuits.
Finally, I want to defend two other decisions of the Long Range Plan:
the rejection of discretionary appellate review5" and the rejection of
the establishment of a new intermediate tier of appellate courts."
The notion of one appeal of right, in my view, is deeply embedded in
our legal culture. It is a sound principle that engenders confidence
in our legal system-a valuable precaution against error. Discretion-
ary review is touted as a device to get rid of the easy cases, but you
have to read that easy case in order to exercise your discretion. The
kinds of cases that would not receive review under such a regime are
generally the easy cases. In my considerable experience, it is no more
work to decide a case with a summary order than to exercise your
discretion not to hear it, and it is much better for our polity to do so.
The Long Range Planning Committee also rejected the proposal for
a new tier of appellate courts. 2 The new tier recommendation
usually takes the form of a new court, staffed in part by district judges
for the review of so-called error-correction cases, in contrast to cases
involving the development of the law. District judges, however,
already have enough to do, and, in my experience, a case that looks
at first like an error-correction case often, upon scrutiny, will turn out
to involve an important legal principle.
49. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 163 app. A, tbl. 2 (speculating that by 2020 there
could be 303judgeships in Ninth Circuit).
50. See id. at 2 (stating that one immutable characteristic of appellate review is "access to
at least one meaningful review for litigants aggrieved by a decision of a trial court or federal
agency"); id. at 132 (noting that elimination of right to appeal should be pursued only as last
resort in context of confronting alternative futures of federal courts).
51. See id. at 46 (rejecting explicitly creation of "new appellate structures").
52. See id.
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I am not sure we can go on in the face of a steadily increasing
workload without more, perhaps quite a few more, appellate judges.
I do underscore, however, that the Long Range Plan rejects the notion
of a cap53 but respects the notion of modest growth.54 There is
room for some expansion in the size of the federal appellate judiciary.
We can absorb more appellate judges-a modest number-now. I
would submit that we should strive mightily to avoid a significant
increase in the size of the federal judiciary.
The federal judiciary has performed magnificently in the history of
this nation; consider, for example, its stewardship in the period
following Brown v. Board of Education and during the constitutional
crisis known as Watergate. Our society must have faith in its courts.
The federal courts have earned that trust. Some believe that the
accomplishments of the district courts in desegregation in the South
during the 1970s would not have been possible had the district courts
been so large that the public would not have had confidence in their
incumbents and hence in their judgments.55 The federal appellate
courts will fail in their mission in the next national crisis, as they
would have failed in the South, if they become diluted by sheer size.
Let us hope that will never happen. Thank you.
(Applause)
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you, Judge Becker, for your
opening remarks. I shall now turn the floor over to Judge Reinhardt.
JUDGE REINHARDT: I guess I should start with a disclaimer. I
have zero years of experience in judicial administration, and I am not
a member of the Long Range Planning Committee. So, I'm the only
objective person on the platform.
(Laughter)
I do not want to get drawn into a long discussion about the size of
the courts because we have more important problems. I think the
judges in the South who fought for civil rights were respected and did
what they did because they had integrity, courage, and belief in
principles. That is what matters now, not how you organize the
courts, what the structure is, or how many judges there are. What we
need on the courts are people who believe injustice, in the Constita-
tion, and the rights of individuals.
53. See id. at 44 ("[T) his plan does not suggest a fixed numerical limit to circuit size.").
54. See id. at 14, 22, 44 (articulating concept of "carefully controlled growth" in Article III
judiciary as absolutely necessary to preserve core values of federal courts).
55. See id. at 7 (describing federal judges as "keepers of the covenant" and discussing
nation's confidence in federal courts).
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I want to start with a preliminary remark about the Chief Justice,
for whom I always have had the greatest respect. He was appointed
to the Court as a man of tremendous conviction. He was known as
the Lone Ranger because he was the only judge who supported the
conservative views that he brought to the Court. He stuck with those
views and those convictions, and he did not accept the theory that
conservatism was dead, just because we were in a new era. He stayed
and fought for those principles, and he stayed there until he won-at
least temporarily. He stayed on the Court until he had five votes, and
then he did exactly what he said he believed in. That is the kind of
judge that I really have the greatest respect and admiration for.
Now, to talk about the problems that do concern me about the
future of the judiciary. I think the federal judiciary is threatened in
three basic ways. First, the role of the federal courts is being
diminished and weakened by decisions of a highly conservative, states'
rights-minded judiciary. These judges have sought, with increasing
success, to limit the influence and effectiveness of federal courts.
They have also sought to reduce access to the federal courts by those
most in need of their protection-the poor, the weak, the oppressed,
and minorities of all kinds. This threat is manifested principally by
judicial revisionism of the Constitution and of jurisprudential
principles, both substantive and procedural. It ranges from a
rewriting of the Commerce Clause to a test-tube rebirth of the Tenth
and Eleventh Amendments, a revival of the pre-1930s anti-Federal
government view, and the cry, 'Just leave it to the states." It is also a
two-sided campaign of instituting procedural obstacles to access to the
federal courts and of raising substantive barriers to the vindication of
individual rights.
The procedural doctrines employed range from standing, mootness,
ripeness, prejudice, waiver, estoppel, procedural default, and
retroactivity principles. These doctrines are used to attack the historic
right to habeas corpus as well as to bar ordinary citizens from
obtaining relief under federal statutes. They also are used to ensure
that federal policies are not carried out, particularly when states follow
policies of unspoken nullification and when a timid federal govern-
ment is unwilling to take the lead in vindicating federal legislation.
The Chief Justice spoke about history-the state of the judiciary
forty years ago.56 Forty years ago when I graduated from law school,
we revered the federal courts and we revered the Supreme Court,
then led by Chief Justice Earl Warren, because that Court had a
56. See Keynote Address, supra pp. 268-69.
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commitment to the Constitution and the courage to do what no other
branch of government did-to stand up for the rights of people and
to end slavery in this country, then functioning under the "separate
but equal" guise.
In law school we learned that the federal courts existed to give the
individuals in this nation fights that they never had. We also learned
of some of the great circuit courts, for instance, the Fifth and Second
Circuits. We admired those judges because they stood between every
individual and an oppressive government. They gave life, breadth,
and meaning to a Constitution that protected the people in this
nation who needed protection from arbitrary government.
We grew up in a period during which Franklin Roosevelt said that
we needed a New Deal because the states never had, and never would,
afford the people the rights they needed. That President believed
that, for many reasons, we could not leave these problems to the
states to solve, either in their courts or in their political bodies. The
debate over states' rights, which was used as an answer to the civil
rights movement when I was in law school, is today mirrored in the
federal courts, in the halls of Congress, and in the White House. It
is not improper that this debate takes place in the three bodies of
government: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Our
courts do, in fact, stand between government and citizens. Our courts
do have a function of interpreting the Constitution and of determin-
ing what words like "due process" mean and what kind of fundamen-
tal rights the people in this nation have. That is the role of the
federal courts.
There also is the question of the structure of government. The
Constitution is a document that speaks with great strength as to the
structure of government There are legitimate differences among
people, both in Congress and in the courts, about what that structure
should be. Those are issues that come before our courts that are of
the greatest importance. They are not as dramatic as the abortion or
the civil rights issues, but the issues of government structure can, in
the end, have as great an effect. Whether we dismantle the federal
government pursuant to a Contract With America or by an implicit
repeal of the Commerce Clause, it is the same type of important issue
that this nation faces, both in the federal courts and in the rest of our
political bodies.
I think that the historic importance of the federal judiciary since
the 1930s, as well as the role the federal judiciary has played in
making this a nation that allows people to be free from oppressive
governmental action and allows them to recognize their individuality,
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greatness, and worth, is threatened. I think that we weaken the role
of the federal courts and shut off individuals' access to them by
adopting procedural rules and regulations and by trying to lessen the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. I
Those who oppose a substantial increase in the size of the federal
courts will tell you that we cannot find these highly-qualified,
wonderful judges who are such marvels. Rather, they will tell you that
the courts have to stay small and efficient and that we really are the
pearls. The federal judicial system is a national treasure because we
have found these wonderful men-and now some women-who are
far superior to the other candidates out there. Yet we say, in the
same breath, "Ship all the cases to the state courts because they can
handle them." Well, how will the state courts find all those judges
who can handle these cases? We say, "Ship out all the death penalty
cases. Do not worry; state court judges understand the Constitution
just as well as we do." Of course, state judges happen to be elected
and have to run for reelection. And, they have to go before voters
who find their decisions quite unpopular.
You will find, if you talk to state supreme court justices, that they
believe that capital punishment cases are like having an alligator in
the bathtub. When you are deciding a capital punishment case, and
you are up for election, no matter how hard you try to be objective,
you cannot ever be sure whether your decision is being influenced by
the fact that you are running for reelection. That is why we have the
writ of habeas corpus. That is why federal courts have played an
important role in protecting individual rights and protecting people
from being executed unfairly. That is why federal courts historically
have overturned a substantial percentage of state court convictions in
capital cases, and that is why it is so important that the writ of habeas
corpus be maintained. That is the first threat I see to the courts.
I believe the second threat to the judiciary is to its independence.
The Chief Justice gave an excellent historical discussion of the
importance of our independence. 7 The Long Range Plan has
beautiful quotes about the importance of the judiciary. How can it
be that in a country with this tradition of an independentjudiciary we
have three prominent leaders-the head of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 8 the President of United States,59 and the Republican
57. See Keynote Address, supra pp. 271-74.
58. Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah).
59. President WilliamJ. Clinton.
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candidate for President,"--who seem to have no comprehension of
this fundamental principle? How can that be?
When ajudge has a case under consideration, you have these three
people putting pressure on him, threatening him with what his
actions will be.6 The head of the Senate Judiciary Committee says,
after a judge whom he threatened has changed his mind, "Well, the
judge changed his mind because 150 Republican congressmen put
pressure on him." Is that what the head of the Senate Judiciary
Committee wants from federal judges? It is difficult to understand
how members of the legislative and executive branches can pressure
members of the judiciary, and it is time for us to be alert and
concerned about their actions. This is not a partisan issue. It is a
serious problem when our political leaders think it is appropriate to
threaten judges. One of the saddest parts is that the judge who
changed his mind in response to political pressure may well have
been right the first time; he may well have been right the second
time. Nobody will ever know. However, when the New York Times has
several front page stories stating that a district judge bowed to
pressure and apologized for his decision 62-- and every newspaper in
the nation played it that way6 -- how are we ever going to tell the
public that this is not the way that federal judges behave?
Fortunately, there are some people who are reminding our political
leaders that it is inappropriate to threaten federal judges. The
60. Senator RobertJ. Dole (R-Kan.).
61. Judge Reinhardt is referring to the criticism thatJudge Harold Baer, Jr., DistrictJudge
for the Southern District of NewYork, received after he ruled, onJanuary 24, 1996, to suppress
80 pounds of narcotics that police officers had seized from a suspect's rented car. See Don Van
Natta, Jr., Judge's Drug Ruling Likely to Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1996, at 27. Not long after
Judge Baer found the evidence inadmissible, Senator Robert J. Dole, soon to become the
Republican presidential candidate, called for the judge's impeachment, commenting that the
judge had "'turned loose a drug dealer.'" Katharin A. Seelye, A Get Tough Message at California's
Death Raw, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1996, at 29. President Clinton's press secretary, Michael D.
McCurry, also indicated that if'Judge Baer did not reverse his suppression ruling, the President
might ask for his resignation. SeeAlison Mitchell, Clinton PressingJudge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 1996, at 1. Three months after his original ruling and "an avalanche of criticism and calls
for his ouster," Judge Baer reversed his decision. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Under Pressure, Federal
Judge Reverses Decision in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Van Natta, Jr.,
Under Pressure].
62., SeeVan Natta,Jr., Under Pressure, supra note 61, at 1 (indicating thatJudge Baer reversed
his decision in response to political pressure and stating that he expressed regret in his
opinion).
63. See, e.g., John J. Goldman, Judge Bows to Pressure, Changes Ruling on Drug Seizure, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at A8 (stating thatJudge Baer reversed himself after having been "roundly
criticized");John M. Goshko & Nancy Reckler, Controversial Drug Ruling is Reversed, WASH. Posr,
Apr. 2, 1996, at Al (stating thatJudge Baer reversed himself after his earlier ruling "provoked
widespread criticism"); Barry Neumeister, Judge Reverses Ruling Change Follows Political Pressure,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at 14 (stating that judge changed his decision after receiving
criticism from local, state, and national politicians).
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president of the American Bar Association sent a letter to President
Clinton and Senator Dole trying to remind them of this. But we are
approaching an election campaign, and there is not much hope of
improvement unless a lot of people in this country recognize that this
type of conduct is a serious threat to the independence of the federal
judiciary that will continue if our political leaders are allowed to get
away with it. We have to stop it now. People have to speak up, even
judges who are not used to taking positions on public issues. The
current Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, as well as three other
former Second Circuit Chief Judges, have had the courage and the
decency to speak up publicly,' and I hope they will be joined by lots
of other judges because this is only the beginning of the attack.
This country has grown in population, ideas, laws, and problems.
We have expanded all kinds of rights and protections. We have
expanded the number of prosecutors tenfold.65 I do not know
where those prosecutors are going to try their cases because we do
not want to expand the number of judges. This does not make a lot
of sense to me: we have more problems, more cases, and more
people, but we do not want to have more judges to keep up with
them. There is something fundamentally wrong here. I am not quite
sure why. I do not know what it is with federal judges. We are
basically a very conservative group. We do not like change. We like
ourselves, and we like to have nice fraternal meetings where we know
our dear brothers, and yes, where we understand each other.
I am going to tell you that despite what you may think, our
relations on the Ninth Circuit are absolutely excellent. We are all
very friendly; we like each other-perhaps because there are more
than just a few of us crammed together in one building. We disagree
very strongly, but there is plenty of collegiality-more than enough,
as far as I am concerned.
In any event, I am in a very small minority. Mostjudges think we
are just fine. They believe that we are just the right size, and that
what we ought to do if we get more and more cases is to spend less
and less time on each case. For example, these judges think that we
should reduce the amount of oral argument, as we have; reduce the
size of briefs, as we have; and reduce the number of opinions that we
64. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Judges Defend a Coleaguefrom Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996,
at BI (reporting rare public statement made by ChiefJudgeJon 0. Newman,JudgeJ. Edward
Lumbard, Judge Wilfred Feinberg, and Judge James L. Oaks, that Senator Dole's criticism of
Judge Baer went "too far").
65. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 12.
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publish, as we have.66 That is all fine, but why do we not have
enough judges to give enough time to the cases? I have read the
LongRange Plan. I have listened to my dear friendJon Newman, with
whom I went to prep school and to law school.67 I have listened to
Judge Becker. I do not understand the problem with increasing the
size of the federal judiciary.
Why is it that as the caseload, the size of the country, and the
number of prosecutors, crimes, and laws all increase dramatically, the
only thing that should not change is the number ofjudges? Whatever
it is, I hope you all understand it, because I do not.
(Applause)
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you, Judge Reinhardt.
Let me just tell you how 3000 new federal judges translates to a law
school professor at a law school where we place about twenty percent
of our graduating students into clerkships-3000 newjudgeships; 6000
new clerkships. Need I say more?
(Laughter)
I now will turn the floor over to Chief Judge Barker.
JUDGE BARKER. I will not leap to the bait and try to answer all
the questions that have been propounded by my brother, Judge
Reinhardt. I will say that Judge Becker and Judge Reinhardt give a
new definition to collegiality and probably illustrate, in their diversity,
what is so great about the federal judiciary-that we occupy a rather
large tent after all.
District judges see the world of federal courts and litigation from
a perspective that is different from the vantage points of the members
of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. After all, we are
where federal litigation begins and where most of it ends. In fact, it
is more fact than boast when I provide you this reminder that most
of the work in the court system gets done at the trial level.
I want to try to identify and explain the perspective of the district
court, to explicate its uniqueness in this debate, and, in this context,
to relate it to one very important aspiration set out in our Long Range
Plan. Some believe that the position of the federal trial judge is less
elevated than the positions of our appellate colleagues. I would not
66. See id. at 11 ("The caseload increase has forced the [federal] courts to adopt a wide
variety of new procedures and practices to cope with the influx.").
67. Jon 0. Newman, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, has authored several articles concerning the health of the federal judiciary. See, e.g.,
Newman, supra note 42;Jon 0. Newman, Determining the Size of the FederalJudiciary Requires More
Than a Mission Statement, 27 CONN. L. REv. 865 (1995); Jon 0. Newman, Restructuring Federal
Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the FederalJudicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1989).
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put it exactly that way. In fact, I would suggest that if you are talking
to other district judges, you should not put it exactly that way.
It is true -that when litigants come knocking on the federal
courthouse door, we have the responsibility to answer their knock.
We are, as it were, the butlers of the federal court system. District
judges, along with our colleagues, the magistratejudges and bankrupt-
cy judges, open the door and let in these callers. Sometimes we
welcome them in from bad weather and sometimes we let them in
from out of the night. Either way, they are allowed in at least so far
as the foyer and within our protection. Once there, we decide, as a
good butler should, how long they get to stay. When they do come,
you can be sure that they enter in all their marvelous variety.
Now, appellate judges, by contrast, hear and see in court almost
exclusively lawyers, not the litigants themselves. Oral arguments, not
the filings but the arguments by pro se appellants and appellees, are
relative rarities, and even then much of the immediacy, not to
mention the personalities of the litigants, has been distilled into the
written record.
It is in the trial courts, including, of course, the bankruptcy courts,
that the full spectrum of federal litigants, along with their coteries of
lawyers, witnesses, family members, jurors, and sometimes even
custodians, in the form of deputy marshals, approach the bench, or
ask to approach the bench in one fashion or another, in order to
redress their grievances.
Whatever other characteristics these litigants and attorneys
appearing before us may have, one common fact about all of them is
totally indisputable: they are a diverse lot, both in terms of their
modal characteristics and their variety. Their diversity itself and the
implications of that diversity will increase and expand dramatically
during the next decades. In Chapter Nine of the Long Range Plan,
the Long Range Planning Committee spells out some of these
demographic fundamentals.' I will cite just a few of these statistics,
as well as reference some other data that are readily available.
Age. One of the primary demographic changes on the horizon is
the age change. The American population, as a whole, is aging."
In 1990, the median age of American citizens was twenty-eight.7
Sometime between 2010 and 2020, fifteen to twenty years from now,
68. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 114-15 (discussing demographic changes in
American population in areas such as age, population, immigration, race, ethnicity, composition
of workforce, as well as trends and crime).
69. See id. at 114.
70. See id.
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the median age will have become greater than forty years of age. 71
For those of you who now are forty or older, think for a minute of
how you have changed since you turned twenty-eight, socially,
professionally, legally, and I ruefully suspect, physically. For those of
you who are twenty-eight or younger, look around at the older folks
and try to imagine, if you can, what your life will be like when you
become older than Jack Benny ever was.
We can forecast with a great deal of certainty and confidence that
this shift in the age structure in our national population will in many
ways drive what is legislated in Washington and what is litigated in the
federal courts. Current debates about health care, Social Security,
pensions, employment rights, and welfare already demonstrate that
these trends are likely to intensify with inevitable consequences for
the work of the federal courts. The aging of the American population
will drive many changes.
Gender. One of the most powerful trends of the years since the end
of World War II has been in another area: gender. It has been
reflected in the increased participation of women in all aspects of the
work force.7" By the turn of the century, more than eighty percent
of women between the ages of twenty-five and fifty-four will be in the
labor force.73 For the great majority of these women, work will take
them away from home during the day. By the turn of the century,
women will account for more than forty percent of the persons
coming into the workforce for the first time.74 We know these
trends will materialize into increases in litigation relating to employ-
ment rights, equal pay, and sexual harassment, to mention only three
areas.
Race and ethnicity. For the nation as a whole, the numbers of
representatives of racial and ethnic groups, as defined by the Bureau
of Census, are growing approximately seven times faster than the
numbers of representatives in the non-Hispanic, white community,
both because of birth rates and immigration patterns.75 By the year
2005, fifty percent of California's population is expected to be
comprised of people of color who will speak eighty different languag-
es.76 Within a few years of 2050, non-Hispanic, whites will comprise
71. See id.
72. See id. at 115 (citing significant increase in number of women in work force during past
four decades).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See i,.
76. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 115.
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less than fifty percent of the nation's population.77 These shifts will
undoubtedly translate into increases in litigation relating to equal
opportunity and discrimination issues, and probably many more
areas.
78
Now, we need not be demographers, futurists, or soothsayers to be
able to conclude that these changes will be important for virtually all
aspects of American life, including the administration ofjustice. This
is as safe a bet as just about any projection over a half century could
be. It is a more troublesome undertaking, however, to go beyond the
general to the more specific projections or conjectures regarding the
consequences of these changes on the substance, procedure, and
administration of law in federal courts during the next century.
The Long Range Planning Committee knew that it had neither the
skill nor the time to engage in such projections and debates in its
report, and tonight neither do I. The Committee was able to do no
more than become generally familiar with demographic trends and
with some opinions held by esteemed demographers and forecasters.
For this reason, the published plan addresses the question of growing
demographic diversity with only a small number of general recom-
mendations, of which three, I think, are most important. They are
brief enough that I can read them to you quickly, and you will be able
to understand them.
Recommendation Seventy-Eight says, "Since both intentional bias
and the appearance of bias impede the fair administration of justice
and cannot be tolerated in federal courts, federal judges should exert
strong leadership to eliminate unfairness and its perception in federal
courts."
7 9
Recommendation Seventy-Nine says, "Federal judges and all court
personnel should strive to understand the diverse cultural back-
grounds and experiences of the parties, witnesses, and attorneys who
appear before them."8"
Recommendation Eighty-One says, "Court interpreter services
should be made available in a wider range of court proceedings in
77. See id. ("[R]acial and ethnic minority groups are growing more than seven times as fast
as the non-Latino white majority."); see also Day, supra note 86, at xxv-xxvi, tbl. M. The
proportion of the total population accounted for by non-Hispanic white members in 2050 is
projected to be 51% and declining. See id.
78. See LONG RANGE PLAN supra note 1, at 113 (explaining that demographic changes will
change nature and substance of disputes in federal courts).
79. Id. at 112 rec. 78.
80. Id. at 113 rec. 79.
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order to make justice more accessible to those who do not speak
English and cannot afford to provide these services for themselves.""'
There are, of course, other recommendations which, as they are
implemented, also will be responsive to the demands for change
imposed by an increasingly diverse population and demographic
changes.8 2 These three, however, are the ones right on point.
Of these three recommendations, only the third contains a
standard, namely that language interpretation should be available
more widely than it is now. 3 The other two are hortatory. They
exhort us as judges and court staff to do the right things, but they do
not provide guidance or standards about what the right things are to
do. I do not say this by way of an apology for the recommendations
generally. Our Committee was not charged with the task of develop-
ing tactics or regulations. On balance, given the entirety of our
agenda, I do not think that we could have done a lot more in this
area, this time around, than we did.
I am hopeful, of course, that the national planning process will
continue, and that the issues that face us under the heading of
preparing the courts to serve the American population in the twenty-
first century will be prominent on the agenda of this continuing
process. But for now, allow me to sketch one specific topic that might
properly become a focus of court planners' attention during the next
rounds of planning.
It is plainly true that in 1996, the groups in charge of planning,
policy, and implementation in the federal courts do not include many
members of the racial and ethnic groups the populations of which are
expected to grow and thus to create the changes that we label
"increasing demographic diversity."84 This is a fact we should not
duck. Another fact is that this situation is changing, albeit slowly.
However, given the tenure provisions of federal judgeships" and the
81. Id. at 116 rec. 81.
82. See, eg., id. at 114 rec. 80 (suggesting thatjustice "be made fully accessible to individuals
wfth disabilities" and encouraging construction and renovation of facilities "to ensure physical
access and remove attitudinal barriers to providing full and equal justice").
83. See id. at 116 rec. 81.
84. See id. at 111-12 (describing effect changing nature of population will have on work of
federal courts).
85. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III ("The judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."); see also
Harlington Wood, Jr., Judicial Reform in Recent Improvements in Federal Judicial Administration, 44
AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1560 (1995) (outlining Article III and stating that constitutional provision
"firmly establishes the judicial branch as independent from the executive and legislative
branches").
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life expectancies of healthy Americans, it will not change as fast as
the population we must serve is changing.
The historic lack of representation of racial and ethnic groups
within the judiciary and the admittedly slow pace of change in this
regard must be assessed, however, in terms of the following assump-
tion, which I think is fair: despite their current apparent homogene-
ity, federal court planners and policy makers will do their best to
make federal courts responsive to the entire American population of
the mid-twenty-first century and not simply to an historically privileged
part of it. I have great faith and confidence in my colleagues in this
regard, although I know that not all Americans automatically share my
view. Like all public institutions, federal courts must continually work
to sustain their legitimacy in the eyes of the entire public. I know
that virtually every one of my judicial colleagues knows this and
believes this, down to their joint and several toes.
These facts and this assumption together create, inevitably I think,
a situation in which policy, strategies, and action will be determined,
for a while at least, by people who do not have a great deal of
firsthand understanding of large portions of the evolving American
population. This is a risky situation to be in. Even with the best of
intentions, decision makers can err if their understandings are
insufficient or just plain wrong. A large dose of modesty is good
medicine for all planners and policy makers.
So, how can we, as planners, increase our chances of making the
right decisions? Among other things, we are obligated to consult,
early and often, in complete candor and openness, with individuals
who can help us understand the expectations and aspirations of the
public that comes before us.87 We must do everything possible to
prevent ourjumping to premature conclusions about differences that
some might claim divide various groups from each other. We will be
well advised to take great care in the language we use to describe the
cultural backgrounds and communities of all the many different
groups whose lives are woven into the tapestry of American life. In
short, as we strive to accept and appreciate diversity, we must never
lose sight of the depth and breadth of our common humanity and the
value that such a deep and broad common humanity represents.
Concerning the kind of information and analysis to which we need
to attend carefully, a brief example may be helpful at this point. I
86. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 114.
87. See id. at 111 (stating that federal courts have obligation to provide "equal justice" for
increasingly diverse population).
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have read-admittedly only a little-about an active field of legal
scholarship that operates under the heading of procedural justice
studies." Put in an overly simple way, procedural justice scholars
study Why people obey the law. More accurately, they study people's
values, preferences, expectations, and beliefs about the law, in
general, and about certain dispute resolution methods, in particu-
lar.8 9
Certain recent studies carried on in this tradition suggest an
important insight that I think future federal court planners should
consider seriously. These studies examine whether we should believe
that different racial and ethnic groups have substantially different
cultural values with respect to their preferences for resolving disputes.
Consider, for example, this quote from a recent publication:
[M]any East Asian cultures are thought to place substantial value
on harmony and conflict avoidance ... and to prefer indirect or
non-confrontational ways of dealing with conflict. European
Americans, on the other hand, .. . are thought to be willing to use
confrontational procedures if these procedures advance fairness
considerations."
Similar comparisons have been made between other ethnic groups,
as well as between men and women.9 1 Note that the claim being
made in these comparisons is that these are differences in basic
values. If these claims that there are differences in basic values were
strictly true, then, it seems to me federal court planning likely faces
a terrible dilemma. Future planning either would have to find a way
to frame different sets of procedures to use in accordance with the
values of different groups appearing in court; or, failing in that
Herculean effort, it would have to accept a certain level of abuse of
at least some of these groups' values. This is not a happy prospect.
I submit, however, that the story is not as sad as it would be if the
theory of deep value differences among widely diverse population
88. See generallyJOHN THIAJOUT & LAURNAWALKER, PROCEDURALJUSTICE (1975) (applying
social psychological methods to assessment of fundamental differences between adversarial and
inquisitorial decision-making processes used in American and European courts). The work of
Thiabout and Walker has created, and continues to create, "a great deal of empirical research
on the topic of procedural justice." Mark R Fondacaro, Toward a Synthesis of Law and Science:
Due Process and Procedural Justice in the Context of National Health Care Reform, 72 DENY. U. L. REV.
303, 325 (1995). For a comprehensive review of procedural justice research, see Tom R. Tyler,
ProceduralJustice Research, 1 SOC. JUST. RES. 41 (1987).
89. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988); TOM R TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
90. E. Allan Lind et al ... And Justice for AIL" Ethnicity, Gender and Preference for Dispute
Resolution Procedur 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 270 (1994).
91. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
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groups were strictly true. The procedural justice scholars report
careful, reliable research that supports a less catastrophic view of the
future of courts to do their w~rk. Here is their interesting and
hopeful conclusion: in studies of groups they label as African-
Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, and European-
Americans, including both men and women, they find substantial
overlap in expectations and preferences for various dispute resolution
procedures.92 To begin with, all the groups preferred direct persua-
sion and negotiation between the parties to more formalized third-
party intervention." This should come as no surprise when you
consider that nobody really likes a lawsuit, or at least they do not like
to go to trial. What is even more significant for us, however, is that
all groups seem to share a common sense of fairness, which has both
distributive and procedural aspects, against which they evaluate any
dispute resolution procedure. Among all these people from all these
diverse cultural backgrounds, not to mention the additional diversity
with gender differences, there is nonetheless a general valuing of
procedures that treat like cases alike and that are perceived to allot
to people what they deserve.
I suggest to you that these two values, fair outcome and equal
treatment, are exactly the ones that should be most fundamental to
the vision of the federal courts in the future in any long range plan.
Indeed, in our Plan, we explicitly said so in the statement of values
relating to equal justice.94
All of this means, I think, that properly conceived and properly
conducted federal court planning and policy making must be
premised on the assumption that our constituents possess this
common humanity and this set of shared values. Those shared values,
equal justice and fairness, are the bottom line, and that bottom line
pushes the diversity issue into manageable dimensions and propor-
tions. Increased diversity surely will impose its own demands on the
courts, especially the trial courts where the most immediate and direct
accommodations must be made.95  These demands need not,
however, distract or confound future judicial planners. In terms of
92. See Lind et al., supra note 90, at 286-89.
93. See id. at 287.
94. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 111 (stating that federal courts have obligation
to provide equal justice and that as American population becomes increasingly diverse,
fulfillment of that obligation will require courts to recognize and address racial, ethnic, and
cultural differences and to remain "scrupulously fair, and free from bias and prejudice").
95. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (discussing recommendations put forth in
the Long Range Plan to accommodate litigants' diverse cultural backgrounds).
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the delivery ofjustice, the good news is that diversity will not matter
all that much.
Thus, judicial planners and policy makers must focus on the over-
arching sense of shared humanity and common values and then be
prepared to deliver on those values. Our task will be to make it clear
that we are, to borrow words from the old Gospel hymn, "standing on
the promises," and once we are there, that we are prepared to deliver
on those promises. Stated otherwise, the challenge in the future will
be not so much for us to find the right things to do, as it will be to do
them. Thank you very much.
(Applause)
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you very much, Chief Judge
Barker. Let us now go to Professor Charles Nihan.
PROFESSOR NIHAN: I propose to take a slightly different tack
than my colleagues on the panel. During the next few minutes, I will
tell you what the federal courts will look like ten, fifteen, and twenty
years from now. I must admit that I undertake this task with a full
appreciation for the considerable wisdom expressed by the great legal
philosopher Yogi Berra who said, "Predictions are risky, especially if
they're about the future." I can tell you with some precision what the
federal courts will look like ten, fifteen, and twenty years from now
because the historical trends that have shaped them for the last half
century almost certainly will continue to shape them for the next
decade and probably the next two decades.
Let me turn first to the short term. It requires neither a futurist
nor a Rhodes scholar to conclude: first, that the number of cases
filed in the federal courts will continue to increase significantly;"6
second, that the resources available to the judiciary will not increase
significantly; and third, Congress will not make significant reductions
in federal jurisdiction. To have a meaningful impact upon the
workload of the federal courts, Congress would have to substantially
eliminate diversity jurisdiction, to substantially eliminate prisoner civil
rights lawsuits, and to return prosecution of street crimes to the states.
Congress is not going to do that. Indeed, Congress is more likely to
expand federal jurisdiction, particularly federal criminal jurisdiction.
This is an election year. National politicians who want to appear
tough on crime can only vote on federal criminal legislation, and vote
they will.
96. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 162-63 app. A, tbl. 2 (projecting that number
of filings, of all types, will continue to increase steadily and dramatically from 2000 through
2020).
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Fourth, the trend toward federal courts becoming criminal drug
courts will accelerate. It is unfortunate that the federal courts have
become an unintended casualty of the War on Drugs, but they are a
casualty nonetheless. There is little that federal trial courts can do to
adjust the amount of time they must invest in processing criminal
cases. In 1994, criminal cases accounted for only thirteen percent of
all federal filings but forty-two percent of all federal trialsY The
Chief Justice recently reported that in some districts, eighty percent
of the trials held were criminal trials98 and indicated that the federal
courts are being transformed into national narcotics courts. 9
Fifth, federal courts can control significantly the way they process
and decide civil cases, and that is just what they will do. So much for
observations about the short term.
What is the probable long term future of the federal courts? In my
view, the Long Range Plan's most significant contribution to the debate
about our federal courts is its comprehensive workload projections,
which were developed using regression equations operating on fifty-
three years of federal caseload data. 10° By combining these work-
load projections with the opinions of a number of federal judges
about the likely impact of this workload, one can obtain a very
valuable and remarkably clear insight into the future. This is not an
exercise in crystal ball gazing; rather, it is the hard-headed analysis in
which lawyers and business people engage every day.
The conclusions that the Long Range Planning Committee drew
from this process are frightening. At least they are frightening to me,
because I believe the Committee got it exactly right. Assuming the
reasonable accuracy of the projections, the Plan predicts that by the
year 2020, only twenty-four short years from now, we will see the end
of the federal courts as we have known them, the end of quality
federal justice, the end of a meaningful distinction between federal
97. See id.
98. See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at United States Sentencing
Commission Symposium on "Drugs and Violence in America" Uune 18, 1993), available in
LEXIS, News Library, Script File (discussing severe demands War on Drugs has placed on federal
courts).
99. See id.
100. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 162-63 app. A, tbl. 2 (estimating number of trial
and appellate filings from year 2000 through year 2020); id. at 145 n.1 ("Regression is the
mathematical process of computing the coefficients of a relationship between one or more
independent variables and a dependent variable to obtain the 'best' fit between actual and
estimated values.").
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and state courts, and the end of coherent and consistent national
law. 101
Let me quote from the Plan itself.
Federal law would be babel, with thousands of decisions issuing
weekly ....
... [D]elay, congestion, cost, and inefficiency would in-
crease.... Those civil litigants who can afford it will opt out of the
court system entirely for private dispute resolution providers....
[T]he civil jury trial-and perhaps the civil bench trial as
well-[will become] a creature of the past. The federal district
courts... would become an arena for second-class justice."°2
This clear description of an apocalyptic federal court future places
the Plan's overwhelming failure in perspective, a failure that, in my
view, will relegate it to serving as a magnet for dust in the offices of
academics. It contains no meaningful plan to implement the Plan.
The Planning Committee has looked into the future; it has identified
correctly a number of serious threats to the federal court system; it
has identified solutions to those threats; and it has forecast the
disaster that will result if the solutions are not implemented. It has
not, however, identified an effective implementation strategy. How
much worse do future outcomes have to be than those described in
the pages of the Plan itself to justify immediate, aggressive, all-out
action on the part of the judiciary to implement its recommended
solutions?
It seems to me that only one of two general conclusions concerning
the Plan can be true. Either the apocalyptic outcomes described in
its pages are simply untrue and were placed there in an editorial
attempt to get congressional, media, and public attention; or these
outcomes are likely to occur, in which case the failure of the judiciary
to act aggressively to avoid them is inexplicable.
Federal judges are the stewards of the federal judicial resource.
They are responsible for the long-range welfare of the federal courts.
In the instant case, a committee of federal judges had identified an
impending, yet completely avoidable, catastrophe. The policy-making
101. See id. at 17-20 (describing two apocalyptic alternatives for future of federal courts). The
LongRange Plan's first scenario is one in which the caseload and the number ofjudges continue
to increase drastically until the judicial system would be restructured entirely and the conference
and consistency of the law would be lost forever. See id. at 18-19. In the alternative vision, the
workload and the number ofjudges increase in the same fashion, but the nation refuses to fund
this growth. See iU. at 19. As a result, each case would receive less attention than it does today,
congestion and would delay increase, and the purpose of the federajudiciary would be altered.
See id. at 20.
102. Id at 19-20.
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body of the federal courts"03 has approved the Committee's conclu-
sions and recommendations, yet the judiciary now proposes to stand
by passively in the hope that the other two branches of government
will take effective action on its behalf.
Remaining passive has a terrible cost; it concedes development of
the judiciary's agenda to others, it forces the judiciary into a reactive
and predominantly negative posture, and it increases substantially the
likelihood that effective action simply will not be taken. Thejudiciary
traditionally has elected to stay out of the political process, and that
is exactly as it should be. If, however, the issue before the two
political branches is the continued existence of the third branch, the
judiciary simply cannot, in my view, continue business as usual. To do
so deprives both the legislative and the executive branches of the
voices of those who know the very most about the federal courts.
Furthermore, it does so at the formative stage of the legislative
process when there is significant opportunity for adjustment and
compromise without direct, interbranch confrontation.
Permit me, if you will, to return to where I began. What is the
future of the federal courts? Absent immediate and aggressive judicial
action, it is a future characterized by a rapidly increasing workload,
slowly increasing resources, a trial docket dominated by criminal
matters, significantly increased bureaucratization, a steady decline in
the amount of judicial attention devoted to each case, and a contin-
ued blurring of the jurisdictional differences between federal and
state courts. Indeed, I predict to you that within twenty-four years,
the primary difference between the federal and state courts will not
be what they do, but where they get their resources.
Finally, I guess I would be remiss in cataloging the attributes of the
future federal judiciary if I did not comment on the issue of the
number of Article III judgeships required, an issue referred to by
both Judges Becker and Reinhardt in their comments." 4 This is a
debate that, for me, is entirely abstract. To determine the appropri-
ate number, one first must know the answer to the question,
appropriate to do what? Clear agreement on the role of the federal
courts simply must precede an intelligent discussion of its appropriate
size. Size is a product of function. It is beyond question that the role
of the federal courts is a political decision to be made by Congress,
and the Plan clearly acknowledges this reality.
103. ChiefJustice William H. Rehnquist presides over the Judicial Conference of the United
States, which formulates and executes policies for the entire judicial branch.
104. See supra pp. 280-81 (Judge Becker's remarks); pp. 292-93 (Judge Reinhardt's remarks).
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The Long Range Plan's most important proposals for resolving the
workload crisis call for congressional action, not for judicial action.
A range of interrelated recommendations urges Congress to make
significant adjustments to federal jurisdiction, thereby preserving the
historic balance between federal and state courts"°5 and allowing
controlled growth in the federal judiciary.1" 6 It is almost certain
that Congress will not respond. First, it is profoundly disinterested in
the problems of the judiciary. Congress is, for all practical purposes,
oblivious to the judiciary as an institution. Second, Congress is most
likely to continue to use the federal courts as a tool to address
problems perceived to be national. In the last twenty years, Congress
has passed more than 200 statutes expanding federal jurisdiction,
addressing matters such as car jacking,0 7 child support, °8 comput-
er fraud,109 street gangs,1 parental kidnaping,m and false iden-
tification." 2 Third, Congress is unlikely to act because the federal
judiciary's natural allies, the organized bar and state judges, do not
support the Long Range Plan's proposed jurisdictional reforms. The
organized bar strongly opposes the substantial elimination of diversity
jurisdiction. State judges, in turn, oppose this change unless the
federal government provides the states with the necessary resources
to process the new state cases that will result. 3 It is simply a sad
fact that most federal jurisdictional reform will do little more than
105. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 21-39. In Chapter 4, the Plan describes the
historic relationship between the state and federal courts. See id. "The state courts have served
as the primary forums for resolving civil disputes and the chief tribunals for enforcing the
criminal law." Id. at 21. The federal courts have retained a much more limited jurisdiction.
See id. The Plan states, however, that as Congress continues to federalize what once were
considered state crimes and continues to create federal civil causes of action, the delicate
balance between state and federal jurisdiction, referred to as judicial federalism in the Plan, is
threatened. See id. at 22. To preserve the sound division of authority between the state and
federal judicial systems-a core value of the federal judiciary--the Committee made 12
recommendations that encourage Congress "to conserve the federal courts as a distinctive
judicial forum of limited jurisdiction." Id. at 23 rec. 1.
106. See id. at 38-39. As a final means of preserving a sound judicial federalism, the Plan
suggests that "[t ] he growth of the Article IIIjudiciary should be carefully controlled so that the
creation of newjudgeships, while not subject to a numerical ceiling, is limited to that number
necessary to exercise federal court jurisdiction." Id. at 38 rec. 15. The policy of carefully
controlled growth for the federal judiciary is emphasized throughout the Plan. See, e.g., id. at
14 (noting 1993 endorsement of carefully controlled growth by Judicial Conference of United
States); see id. at 44 (applying concept of carefully controlled growth to recommendations for
courts of appeals).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669 (1994).
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
110. See id.§ 521.
111. See id.§ 1204.
112. See id.§ 1028.
113. See generally Victor E. Flango & Craig Boersema, Changes in Federal Diverity Jurisdictions:
Effects on State Court Caseloads, 15 U. DAYrON L. REV. 405 (1990).
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take cases out of the federal courts and put them in the state courts.
In these times of shrinking federal budgets, the chances of enacting
a new federal program to support state courts is, at best, slim. More
probably, it is nonexistent.
Finally, I offer for your consideration the opinion that the entire
concept of controlling judicial workload by constricting jurisdiction is
as false as it is appealing. The number of new cases filed in federal
and state courts may be far more a function of the number of lawyers
in the work force than it is a function of the number of laws granting
jurisdiction.
What about returning prosecution to the states? It, too, will not
happen. Prosecutors, both federal and state, will continue to favor
federal prosecution whenever possible because the federal system has
mandatory minimum sentences, sentencing guidelines, broad asset
forfeiture provisions, no parole, available prison space, and adequate
prosecutorial resources. States are only too willing to sell their
sovereignty. Indeed, if the states have a complaint about the federal
prosecution of street crime, it is that there is not enough of it.
Of all the major variables that will define the future of the federal
courts-jurisdiction, process, size, structure, resources-the only one
that is within the primary control of the judiciary is process. For that
reason, changes to process will continue to constitute the judiciary's
primary response to caseload increases. Whether this is a good thing
is open to question. The very essence of the federal judiciary is being
changed substantially to allow a relatively fixed number of federal
judges to deal with an ever-increasing caseload. It is being changed
by continuous adjustments to process, adjustments that I believe
would attract very little support outside the judiciary if put to a vote.
Consider, for just a moment, the significant changes that have
taken place in just the federal courts of appeals during the last thirty
years. Last year, more than half of the cases filed in the courts of
appeals were denied oral argument.1 4  Instead, these cases were
decided summarily on the papers initially submitted by the parties.
Recently, in the Third Circuit, seventy percent of all cases filed in a
single year were decided summarily, without oral argument."- The
opinions issued in these cases are not the traditional reasoned
114. SeeJUDICIAL BusINESS, supra note 47, at 48 (stating that during 12-month period ending
Sept. 30, 1995, 60.1% of all appeals filed in courts of appeal were terminated after submission
on briefs).
115. See id. (asserting that, during 12-month period ending Sept. 30, 1995, 70.3% of all
appeals filed in Third Circuit were terminated after submission on briefs).
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opinions that address the issues raised by the parties, and many
present nothing more than the court's conclusion.
I suggest that those of you who would vigorously oppose proposals
to address the appellate caseload crisis by eliminating the traditional
right of appeal had better examine whether the federal courts already
have not done exactly that. Judge Becker said the Committee
considered eliminating appeal as of right, but rejected that proposal.
I say to you, the federal courts already have implemented it. I submit
that there is little practical difference between a system of discretion-
ary appellate review, in which the court denies a petition for certiora-
ri, and a system in which the parties apparently enjoy a traditional
right of appeal, yet their case is decided without oral argument and
without a reasoned, written opinion. In both situations-denial of
certiorari and this new, truncated appellate process-the parties never
have an opportunity to address the appellate judges who will decide
their cases and thus never learn the judges' concerns. Furthermore,
because the parties do not receive a reasoned opinion, they never
have certainty that the issues they raised on appeal actually were
considered.
What then is the long-term future for the federal courts? It is truly
bleak. I believe that if the federal judiciary does not disavow its
traditional non-political posture and take the lead in saving itself by
working aggressively with the two political branches, it soon will be a
seriously weakened institution, devoting the overwhelming portion of
its time to criminal matters and dispensing second-class civil justice to
those with insufficient resources to go elsewhere. Thank you.
(Applause)
JUDGE BECKER Well, if I can interject, Professor Nihan's view of
the present state of affairs is wrong. It is a cynical view, and his
representation of justice in the United States courts of appeals is
wrong and deserves to be condemned immediately-instanter, to use
a fancy word.
It simply is not true that merely because a litigant does not receive
oral argument or a reasoned, written opinion, that litigant has not
received justice. My colleagues on the Third Circuit and I, as well as
the judges in courts of appeals across the country, take very seriously
our obligation to read the briefs, consider, and discuss the cases. We
do it, and we do it in each and every case. I read every page of every
brief in every case, and so do my colleagues; and we either exchange
memoranda or we discuss the cases, either over the telephone or,
more commonly, in conference.
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We should, however, grant argument in more cases. I think that
the federal courts of appeals need to reverse course in that respect.
They do, however, give oral argument in all cases that need it and in
all cases that it will help.
We do not have to write opinions in every case, whether for
publication or otherwise. Many cases are fact-bound; many cases do
not involve new principles; and not every case requires, or even
deserves, a written opinion.
Professor Nihan's view is entirely cynical; it says you cannot trust the
judges. That is wrong. You can trust the judges. The judges are
honest, honorable, and diligent. They work hard. They read the
briefs, and they consider the cases. So, it simply is not true that we
already have a system of discretionary review.
I also want to respond at some point to Professor Nihan's view of
how the federal judges should get into politics, and how we can save
ourselves if we do, but perhaps I will save that discussion for later.
JUDGE REINHARDT: The real truth is about halfway between the
two of you. The quality ofjustice is not what it used to be. It cannot
be. We have ten times as many cases per judge; we just cannot spend
the same amount of time that we used to spend on cases. We never
used to waste our time. We do not spend nearly as much time per
case as we did. The number of appeals has increased ten-fold in the
last thirty-five years." 6 The number of judges has increased by
slightly more than two-fold." 7 We do give quicker justice. Maybe
the results are not wrong too many times. But with the right number
of judges, we would give better justice and better treatment to the
litigants who deserve more than this kind of second hand treatment
in a lot of cases. It is, however, not nearly as bad as the Professor
suggests.
Fortunately, life does not work the way these people who make
these projections predict. If I could just put this in some perspective.
You hear about these 3000judges, or perhaps 10,000judges, and this
apocalypse. We have 167 federal appellate judges.. in this whole
country of 300 million people. Now, if we had, instead of 167judges,
350judges, neither thejudicial system nor the country would collapse.
116. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 15 tbl. 4 (noting that in 1960, 3899 appeals were
filed in courts of appeals, but that by 1995, number had risen to 49,671).
117. See id. at 16 thl. 6 (stating that in 1960, there were 313 judgeships, and in 1995, there
were 816).
118. See id.
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Three years ago, I proposed that we go from 167 federal appellate
judges to 325,119 so we can do what Professor Nihan says-spend
twice as much time as we do per case. Judging by the opposition to
this proposal, you would think that, by going to 300 judges for 300
million people, we were flooding the nation with unqualified federal
judges. Why is it that this nation, which spends more on a space
shuttle than it does on the federal judiciary, cannot afford another
160judges, so that each of us can spend twice as much time per case
and keep Professor Nihan from getting apoplectic?
It is not such a big problem to create additional judgeships, and the
solution is not so difficult. Furthermore, we do need a lot more
judges to be able to handle the cases we already have. ,
I agree with everything Professor Nihan said. Congress is not going
to cut back our jurisdiction significantly.2 ' Some people want to
cut back our jurisdiction in civil cases. They do it indirectly by
limiting access to the courts. It is, however, better to have too much
access than too little.
I also agree with Professor Nihan that once you find out what your
jurisdiction is, use that as a guide to determine the number ofjudges
necessary.12 1 We are not going to get Congress to cut back our
criminal jurisdiction. I wish they would, but with this wonderful
President we have, we have just added fifty capital crimes to the
federal courts. We are becoming flooded with capital crimes that are
coming to us from the state courts. That was not good enough. Now,
they are going to flood us with capital crimes from the federal courts.
Well, we can handle all these cases, but we need some more judges;
that is all. If we would stop conducting all these damn studies and
surveys and stop placing judges on commissions and, instead, give the
federal judiciary enough judges, we will do the job.
JUDGE BARKER: I am going to respond to Judge Reinhardt. I
resent, in an intellectual way, the premise that the Long Range
Planning Committee's recommendations for measured growth in the
federal judiciary were based on a sense of elitism or favoritism for the
federal bench that emanates from the personalities of the people who
have been selected to hold the office. This personality-based rationale
did not come into any of the discussions and did not support our
119. See Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to Save the Federal Courts,
79 A.BAJ. 52, 53 (1993).
120. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (positing that Congress likely will not
significantly curtail federal jurisdiction).
121. See supra p. 304 (asserting that "size is a product of function" and that before one can
speculate about judiciary's size, one must clearly establish its jurisdiction).
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decision. One reason that the Long Range Planning Committee
reached the conclusion of carefully controlled growth in the federal
judiciary relates to the structure of the judiciary122 and to the way
we need to position it to do the work in the manner we think the
Constitution requires. The federal courts are supposed to be courts
of limited jurisdiction, 123 and you cannot read the size chapters in
the Long Range Plan124 and understand them without understanding
the federal courts' jurisdiction and the other issues that comprise the
Plan. It is really a distortion to suggest that the Planning Committee
has some venial interest in preserving what exists from encroachment
by lesser human beings. That is, as I say, intellectually offensive to
me.
I also want to state that when you cite statistics showing that the
number of judges has increased by only a small percentage, you
ignore the fact that the whole pace of our society has increased. We
are more efficient human beings now than we were. We have devised
ways of superimposing efficiencies on the judicial process that were
not available to us forty years ago. The computer makes a big
difference. For example, when a district court receives a brief that a
law firm has created overnight, that is in violation of all the page
limitations, by the way, and that requests an immediate court response
regarding some injunctive or expedited relief, it tells you something
not only about the pace at which we are working, but at which we are
able to work. Transportation is faster. The way we find the law is
faster. So, these statistics showing that the number of judges has
increased by only a small percentage really distort the fact that the
work is being done more efficiently now than in the past. It is true
that we have to operate in many ways on tiptoes, but we have not
come to a point at which we have imposed all the efficiencies on this
process that are available to us.
PROFESSOR NIHAN: At least I concede the moral high ground
to Judge Becker. It seems to me that there can be no doubt that
122. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 41-55 (discussing structure of federal judiciary).
123. See id. at 8 (recognizing that federal courts were intended "to be a distinctive judicial
forum of limited jurisdiction, performing the tasks that state courts, for political or structural
reasons, could not"); id. at 21 (stating that state courts traditionally have been primary fora for
resolving civil disputes and enforcing the criminal law and that federal courts have had more
limitedjurisdiction). Seegeeraly U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 (establishingjurisdiction of federal
courts).
124. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 9-16 (presenting historical caseload and future
projections of federal courts); id. at 17-20 (outlining possible scenario of future growth of
federal courts); ida at 44-46 recs. 17 & 18 (making recommendations related to circuit size and
workload).
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federal judges are "rationing justice on appeal."'1 It is not that
they are bad people. They are doing what everybody else does when
they have far more work than they have time. They do some things
completely, some things partially, and some things not at all. I recall,
quite vividly, a debate between Judge Becker and former Chief Judge
Browning of the Ninth Circuit. In that closed-door debate, Judge
Browning asserted to Judge Becker that if he and his colleagues were
reading the briefs in every case, they simply were not doing theirjobs;
that the amount of time an appellate judge could invest in a case was
limited, and it did not include reading the briefs in every case.
If my view is cynical, I wonder, Judge Becker, how would you
disassociate yourself from the language in the Long Range Plan, which
I quoted earlier?'26
JUDGE BECKER: Well, I think Judge Browning was playing devil's
advocate. I think he was being-
PROFESSOR NIHAN: Well, in that case, that is what I am doing,
too.
JUDGE BECKER. He was being audacious. Insofar as the language
in the Plan is concerned, the language that you cite is conditional.
We simply strung the projections out numerically. We did not predict
that that is what will happen. We do not know what is going to
happen. 2 7
If you are talking about incrementally, in the last four or five years,
between the time we started our deliberations and the present time,
things are not that much worse. For instance, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, the district court with which I am most familiar, is no
busier now than it was four or five years ago. When you talk about
the volume of criminal cases, there is one solution to the criminal
caseload; it is called the guilty plea. Not all of these cases go to trial.
A very small percentage of this increased number of criminal cases
goes to trial.
When you talk, however, about having to rely on Congress, it is not
just Congress that is responsible for the criminal caseload; it is also
the Justice Department. The time may come when the Justice
125. Judge Learned Hand used this phrase in an address before the Legal Aid Society of New
York. See Learned Hand, Thou Shall Not Ration Justice (Feb. 16, 1951), in 9 CASE BRIEF 4, 5
(Apr. 1951) ("If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment; Thou shall
not ration justice.").
126. See supra p. 303.
127. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that Long Range Plan's caseload
projections "provide only a rough approximation of future caseloads and the assumptions
underlying the projections are open to challenge, as would be assumptions underlying any future
caseload projections").
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Department may decline some of these prosecutions, or many of these
prosecutions, as indeed they have done in certain districts when they
see that the courts cannot handle them.
If you are talking about a long-range plan, you are projecting
twenty to twenty-five years into the future. Demographically, it has
been projected that drug use will decline in the next twenty to twenty-
five years, as the average population gets older. Therefore, if you are
going to project a straight-up growth in criminal caseload, you better
think about whether twenty or twenty-five years from now, for a whole
host of reasons, demographic, educational, and otherwise, drug use
may decline-like smoking has declined in the past twenty or twenty-
five years. If drug use declines, so will the volume of prosecutions.
I do not disassociate myself from anything in the Plan; I simply note
that we said that if those projections come true-and we are not by
any means sure that they will come true-then we have to deal with
what we call the "nightmare scenario."128 The one thing that every-
body is overlooking, however, is the impact of what will happen to the
federal courts if we let this happen. That leads me to how we get
things done.
Now, I am not quite sure how the federal judiciary-which has how
many votes?-can influence the politicians in the House or Senate.
Although I wish I shared Professor Nihan's confidence that vigorous,
aggressive political activity by the federal judiciary would change
things, I do not think that is going to happen.
Professor Nihan's comment that we lack an implementation strategy
goes back to my very first remarks regarding the federal judiciary's
ability, or lack thereof, to control its destiny.2 9 We do not have
any; we do not control our own destiny. Our destiny is left largely to
the Congress, and to some degree, to the Executive.13 0 I can only
hope that dissemination of the Long Range Plan and that symposia,
such as this one at the Washington College of Law, will help educate
the public and, through the public, the political powers that be about
the enormous importance of the federal judiciary as a national
institution and the potential threat to the federal judiciary if those in
power do not do something.
128. See id. at 17-20 (describing two alternative but equally "nightmarish" scenarios for future
of federal courts); id. at 129-40 (proposing methods of responding if "nightmarish" future is
realized).
129. See supra pp. 278-79 (commenting on extent to which federal judiciary controls its own
business).
130. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 2 ("Congress sets the courts' budgets and the
scope of federal jurisdiction; the executive branch determines the government's prosecutorial
and civil litigation strategies .... ").
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in the Lopez case, 131 has pointed
out the limits on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to
federalize state crimes'32 and has sent a message, or at least will
send a message to the legislative branch. So, I think there are a lot
of things happening that can reverse the increasing caseload, and I do
not share Professor Nihan's total pessimism about our future.
PROFESSOR NIHAN: Well, I would only offer, Judge Becker, that
it seems to me that waiting for drug education to drive drug cases out
of the federal and state courts is not a plan, but a prayer.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: I think this would be a good time to open
up the discussion to include the audience. Judge Sporkin?
AUDIENCE MEMBER, JUDGE SPORKIN: l 3  You must realize
that we are a market for society. When a market needs assistance, it
does it with privatizing a lot of its civil area. Why do we need all this
appellate activity if there is a good clear decision? Private parties
arbitrate. They do not worry about appeal from arbitration. They
have their decision, and it is over with. For us to have to sit here,
hear cases, make decisions, and then have the appellate courts say we
are wrong-and they have to make that decision-we are wasting all
of that time. Where do you fit in the private initiatives such as
arbitration, mediation, and those aspects?
JUDGE BECKER: I respond to Judge Sporkin by pointing out that
Chapter Ten of the Long Range Plan encourages each federal court to
expand the scope and availability of alternative methods of dispute
resolution.M There are several places in the Long Range Plan where
we commend alternative dispute resolution.' We describe it as a
case management tool. 6
JUDGE REINHARDT: It is still a free country, and anyone who
wants to arbitrate can arbitrate. In all of these cases, it takes two to
consent to arbitration. There is nothing wrong with having arbitra-
tion. I am all in favor of it, but I am opposed to compulsory
arbitration. I think that the justice received in the federal courts
should be the fairest and finest form of justice you can get.
131. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
132. See id. at 1630-31 (overturning portion of statute that made carrying firearm in school
zone federal offense because education is traditionally state-regulated field and no evidence
indicated that gun-use near schools has substantial effect on interstate commerce).
133. DistrictJudge Stanley Sporkin, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia.
134. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 134.
135. See id. at 70 rec. 39 (recommending that federal courts encourage use of alternative
dispute resolution techniques "to assist in achieving ajust, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of civil litigation").
136. See id. at 70-71.
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In California, we now have a two-tier system of justice. We have
private dispute resolution where all thejudges, as soon as they can get
their pensions, become private judges. They go off and they handle
the cases for the rich people. The poor people get stuck with the
judges who are waiting to become private judges. That is not a very
healthy or happy system.
Done properly, arbitration is a very important supplement. I am all
for improving it and encouraging more people to use it.
JUDGE BARKER: In fact, we have a rather expansive process of
mediation in the federal district courts already. In our court at least,
the magistratejudges spend enormous amounts of time bringing cases
to some sort of settlement before they need to rule on motions or to
conduct trials. In fact, in our federal district court, 98.6%-even with
your normal body temperature-of our civil cases settle without a
trial.137 That does not mean that they settle without a judge ruling
on motions, but at least they do not have to go to trial. So we have
a very effective mediation process going on in the courts.
AUDIENCE MEMBER, JUDGE SPORKIN: To say that you cannot
give the Long Range Plan any statistics regarding alternative dispute
resolution does not make sense. Those numbers have to be a factor.
JUDGE BARKER: Alternative dispute resolution is factored into the
Plan, and we count on those resources. We always are devising new
ways to do it. I think that Judge Reinhardt is right, however, that
private alternative dispute resolution will take a large section of the
docket that is presently before the federal courts. That may be one
of the ways we stay afloat. On the other hand, it will change the
nature of the work of the courts. The law declaration process will
shift because there will be a different sort of clientele in the courts.
AUDIENCE MEMBER, JUDGE SPORKIN: Is that working?
JUDGE BARKER: Yes.
AUDIENCE MEMBER, JUDGE SPORKIN: If we were better, then
we would get the cases; if we are not better, then it is going to go
private?
JUDGE REINHARDT: If litigants have to wait long enough to get
into court, part of the federal judiciary may go private. If the federal
courts provide enough opportunity and facilities-if we have enough
judges to do the job properly-then people would not have to wait,
and they may prefer to have first-class justice, which is what I hope the
federal courts will always provide.
137. SeeJUDICEAL BusINEss, supra note 47, at 165 thl. c-4A (demonstrating that in District of
NewJersey, only 2.4% of civil cases reach trial).
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I frankly do not understand this problem of an overwhelmingly
largejudiciary. We are not talking about an awful lot of people when
we talk about 167 appellate courtjudges in an entire nation. We still
have a fairly small judiciary. We are not talking about a voluminous
increase. I have not heard any good reason why, but I do think
everybody has recognized that we are basically in the hands of the
policy makers, and that the judges are not making national policy. I
think we probably all agree that Congress is not going to take away a
lot of the jurisdiction in criminal law that we would like to lose.
I suggested doubling the size of the judiciary before the 1994
congressional elections."s After the election, everybody said, do not
spend a dime on anything; instead just dismantle the government. I
think we have to wait until we are through with that period, and there
will come a time again when people recognize that the government,
including the courts, serves a useful function. A time will come once
again when people will be willing to spend money for justice as well
as for other things. I think we are in a bleak period with regard to
increasing the size of the courts and expanding justice, but sooner or
later, rather than have a long-range plan, I would like this country to
return to the idea of government spending the money to serve the
people by giving themjustice. The judiciary is a very minimal part of
national spending. Nevertheless, until that happens, we are going to
be in the same kind of trouble that lots of other people are.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Let us take another question from the
audience.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: This might be purely academic. Are there
any categories of crimes, specific crimes, that you feel are unnecessary
and that Congress might attempt to eliminate in order to lessen the
judicial caseload?
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Judge Barker?
JUDGE BARKER: We articulate in the Plan some criteria by which
you should decide whether something is properly brought into the
federal court under the criminal system. 39 Those are pretty good
guidelines. There has to be some sort of national interest at stake, for
instance. There has to be some reason to use federal resources which
are scarcer than state resources. I think the criteria in the Plan are
a pretty good indication. I would say Congress does not want to look
at it in that sort of theoretical way. Their tendency to federalize a
138. See Reinhardt, supra note 119, at 52-53.
139. See supra note 30 (quoting Plan's recommendations regarding types of criminal activity
over which federal courts should have jurisdiction).
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variety of criminal behavior is a political response. Federal jurisdic-
tion is not as much law as it is politics. The point of the Plan was to
get people to think more theoretically about it.
From the district court's perspective, federalization of behavior so
that it comes into federal court for some sort of remedy or sanction
really is only one part of the problem. The other equally intrusive
and difficult imposition that is made by Congress, and sometimes by
the courts of appeals, is to tell the district court how to do its work.
They tell us which cases have to go fast and which ones have to go
slow. They tell us that they have to be done within sixty days, or they
have to be done within ninety days. Most of these actions have been
taken, in my view, because tinkering with the way the federal courts
do their work is regarded as having no budgetary impact. We can just
tell the judges to go faster, or we can tell them to prioritize these
cases over others.
If you just took the criminal sentencing process, it is not the
guidelines, per se, that impose the burden on the district court;
rather, it is having to go through so many hoops. It is having to try
to fact find, by a preponderance of the evidence, on very small,
minor, sometimes inconsequential, factors-factors that judges never
took into account before, or at least that they did not have to resolve.
Now you have to resolve everything, and you have to articulate your
reasons. So we have sentencing hearings that last two hours instead
of twenty minutes because we have to go through this whole process.
We also have the treatment of civil cases that requires us to march to
a drumbeat that Congress imposes on all of the courts without any
real sense of individualized court culture. That is an enormous
problem for the district courts in managing their own business.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Let us return to the topic of redrawing
the federal circuits. On March 20th of this year, the Senate passed a
bill, Number 956,140 that would establish a commission to study
splitting the Ninth Circuit as part of an overall review of the federal
appellate court system.141 Some people say that the Ninth Circuit
140. Ninth Circuit Court ofAppeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. 956, 104th Cong. (1996);
142 CONG. REC. S2544-46 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
141. Senate Bill Number 956, as approved by the Judiciary Committee, creates two circuits
from the current Ninth Circuit: a new Ninth Circuit made up of California, Hawaii, Guam, and
the Northern Mariana Islands, and a Twelfth Circuit composed of Alaska, Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. See S. REP. No. 104-197, at 2 (1996). This bill was
amended on the Senate floor by Senator Murkowski (R-Alaska), on behalf of Senators Akaka (D-
Haw.), Biden (D-Del.), Burns (D-Mont.), Feinstein (D-Cal.), Kennedy (D-Mass.), and Reid (D-
Nev.). See 142 CONG. REC. S2544-45 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996). The amendments deleted the
structural changes recommended by the Judiciary Committee and, in their place, established a
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. See id. The bill then
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is too large and overburdened to be an effective judicial unit. Others
say that the move to split the Ninth Circuit is simply an effort to
remove some states from the reach of California's federal appellate
judges, like Judge Reinhardt. Do we really need a commission at the
cost of half a million dollars to make recommendations to Congress?
Judge Becker, you spoke about redrawing the circuits. What would
that look like? What would the consequences be?
JUDGE BECKER. The current circuit alignment is essentially well
over 100 years old. 42 I do not think the Republic would fail if we
seriously looked into redrawing the circuits. There was a time early
in the history of the nation when New York and New England were
in one circuit. Now we have one circuit, the First Circuit, that has six
active judges, and if the Ninth Circuit grows to its projected size, it
will have thirty-eight active judges. To me, that does not make any
sense. We should try to equalize the size of these circuits, at least in
terms ofjudicial personnel.
I think, frankly, that the idea of a commission to study circuit
structure is a good one. One of the precepts that we have promulgat-
ed with respect to appellate structure favors regional circuits-the
idea that there are certain legal cultures in certain areas. But then,
consider what Congress has come up with-a proposal that would
divide the Ninth Circuit and create a circuit that goes from Alaska to
Arizona. Alaska and Arizona are not part of a region. On the other
hand, you might say that the Eighth Circuit is not a regional circuit
because it includes North Dakota and Arkansas. And you might say
that the Sixth Circuit is not a regional circuit because it includes
Michigan and Tennessee, which are very different. So, I think it
would be a good idea to have a commission that would look at the
overall picture.
My view is that the only meaningful way you can split the Ninth
Circuit is to divide California in two. You could have the Northern
and Eastern Districts of California with Oregon, Washington, and
Alaska, and the Southern and Central Districts with Nevada, Hawaii,
Arizona, or what have you. You could argue that Montana and Idaho,
which are mountain states, should go into the Tenth Circuit.
was referred to the House Judiciary Committee. See 142 CONG. REc. H2663 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1996).
142. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 45 n.8 (stating that apart from the division of
the Eighth Circuit in 1929, the division of the Fifth Circuit in 1981, and the creation of the
Federal Circuit in 1982, the present circuit alignment has remained unchanged since 1866); see
also ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A CENTURY OF GRO~vTH 1 (stating that
basic structure of circuits has not changed since Evarts Act of 1891).
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The Republic would survive the division of California. The only
problem would be the unpredictability of California law. Judge
O'Scannlain, Judge Reinhardt's colleague on the Ninth Circuit, has
demonstrated how you could solve this problem by creating an en
banc of the two circuits. There are many ways you could handle it,
but it is never going to get through without a commission. If you have
a commission, it must look at all of the circuits, consider the best
method of aligning them, and see what we come up with.
JUDGE REINHARDT: California is a state. We like ourselves. We
like being a state, and we do not want to be split. But I think we
should combine the states of Pennsylvania and New Jersey into one
state. The nation would not crumble, as Judge Becker says. We
happen to be a state. I do not want to sound like one of these states'
rights people, but we do not want to be split into two circuits.
JUDGE BARKER. Not to worry.
JUDGE REINHARDT: I am not opposed to a study on combining
some of these small, piddling circuits. I sat on the First Circuit once,
I wrote a dissent, and they were shocked. I mean, it was such a nice,
collegial little body where you had a wonderful time, and you were
not supposed to disagree. Well, you know, there are various ways to
do things. I think there is no harm in taking another look; most of
these commissions do not do much more harm than they do good.
So we can have another survey, another study. We will get some law
professors who will become reporters for these commissions.
JUDGE BARKER Did you favor the split of the Fifth?
JUDGE REINHARDT: I was not a judge then.
JUDGE BARKER But I am sure you had an opinion.
JUDGE REINHARDT: No, I did not. I did not have an opinion.
I was just a lawyer trying to get justice for people.
I think it is all right to study splitting California, but you are going
to raise some difficult problems. For instance, we have never split
states-any state. It makes no sense for a state like California or New
York to split and have two different circuits. We are going to have to
adjust to the fact that we do have big states in this country. I know
people from small circuits and small states never like people from
New York or California. There is always this rivalry with the large
states, and there is the regional problem. The Northwest has felt that
they were losing cases because of California judges. The fact is that
they were losing the cases before Washington judges and Oregon
judges, not California judges. But it was a nice political argument
that senators could make-just blame California.
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This bill 43 went through the Senate as a purely political way of
saying, "We want courts to decide cases the way we want; we want
them to decide them the way the timber industry or the fishing
industry wants them, or else we are going to split your circuit." There
are a few senators who made those speeches on the floor.'" That
is not a way to divide circuits. There is nothing magic about these
twelve circuits. If there is a better way to divide them, I certainly am
not opposed to it. But nobody, including Judge O'Scannlain, has
come up with a decent way of dealing with large states.
I think the other problem is that you do not want to end up with
too many circuits. If you do, surely, sooner or later, you will end up
with another level of courts, which is not good for anybody.
JUDGE BECKER: I would like to respond, if I may. The Chief
Justice's earlier remarks made clear that we do not have a problem if
we have a few more circuits, because the Supreme Court has ample
capacity now to resolve circuit splits. 4 '
More importantly, let us make clear what we are talking about with
respect to this fiction of splitting California. The only legal signifi-
cance of splitting California is that the Northern Circuit and the
Southern Circuit might have a different prediction as to California
state law. Insofar as federal cases are concerned, there is no differ-
ence whether a circuit is inside the state or outside the state. The
problem of predicting state law exists anyway. For example, the Third
Circuit predicts New Jersey law. New Jersey is across the river from
New York whose law is predicted by the Second Circuit. But the
Second Circuit probably spends as much time predicting New Jersey
law as the Third Circuit does because of New York's proximity to New
Jersey. New Jersey does not have a certification statute. One of the
proposals we made in the Long Range Plan was that all states should
have certification statutes."4 So, if California had a certification
statute, and there was a disagreement as to what California law was,
the case could be certified to the California Supreme Court and it
would state what California law was.
143. S. 956.
144. See 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton);
id at S7505-06 (statement of Sen. Conrad Bums).
145. See Keynote Addes, supra p. 270 (noting that federal district courts and courts of appeals
bear brunt of growth in litigation and the Supreme Courts handles fewer cases today than it did
in recent years).
146. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 1, at 32 rec. 8 (encouraging states to adopt
certification statutes "under which federal courts (both trial and appellate) could submit novel
or difficult state law questions to state supreme courts").
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All we are talking about is predicting California state law, and in my
view, that is not an insuperable problem. Sure, it would not be
desirable to have the Southern Circuit predict California law one way,
and the Northern Circuit to predict it another way. If the case
presents a matter of any importance, you could have an en banc of
the two circuits, and they could settle what California law is. But
California could change it the next day. The California Supreme
Court has the last word, and they are the ones that can, and should,
say what California law is.
JUDGE BARKER: The courts of appeals worry about how to split,
and the district courts worry about how to consolidate. In fact, in the
Plan we talked about some states that have three districts. 47 In my
view, it does not make any sense to have three. It does not make any
sense to have three different probation offices, three different clerks,
and all of that. It particularly does not make sense in metropolitan
areas that have one circuit and one district court on one side of the
bridge and another circuit and a whole other set of courts on the
other side of the bridge. Kansas City has that problem. So does the
area between Louisville, Kentucky and Southern Indiana-and many
other places.
We tried to address that issue in the Plan by suggesting that when
we consider these dividing lines, we must have some rational basis for
maintaining them."4 We recognize that it is an enormous political
question to abolish districts in a state and it is not likely to happen.
We can, however, consolidate some of the collateral resources, and
that was one of the things we urged. 149
PROFESSOR NIHAN: It is hard for me to understand what Judge
Becker finds so objectionable about a circuit of thirty-eightjudges. It
seems to me, that when we look at the proposals to merge courts, split
courts, stack courts, or specialize courts, an immutable law of
mathematics comes into play. That is, when you are done redistrict-
ing, the judiciary, you have exactly the same number of cases and the
same number of judges to decide those cases as you had when you
started. If we split the Ninth, it will not allow judges to be more
productive; it will not allow litigation to be processed any faster; it will
not allow litigation to be processed more inexpensively. What is the
purpose?
147. See id. at 51 n.28.
148. See id. at 51.
149. See id.
1996] SYMPOSIUM ON THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 321
JUDGE BECKER: To allow them to be more collegial. Collegiality
is not sociability. It makes the court of appeals a meaningful kind of
unit. I do not want to spend any more time on it because I discussed
it during my principal presentation. -
PROFESSOR NIHAN: It sounds to me like collegiality is another
way of saying that we are going to structure the courts to provide a
working environment that the judges find acceptable. I do not
believe that is the way we ought to approach circuit size.
JUDGE BECKER That statement is simply wrong. Collegiality is
not a question of what judges find acceptable; it is, from the point of
view of judicial administration, what is sound.
JUDGE REINHARDT: It is the Third and Second Circuit judges
using their point of view to tell the Ninth Circuit judges what is
acceptable and how they should be collegial. We find the Ninth
Circuit perfectly collegial and acceptable, and we will match our
decisions against those of the Second or Third Circuits. I tell you our
court is doing a fine job, and we do not need any advice about
splitting.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: I'd like to welcome you all to the battle
of the network circuits.
(Laughter)
In the interest of time, I am going to ask each panelist to make one
final point, and then I- will conclude the session. We will go in
reverse order this time. Professor Nihan?
PROFESSOR NIHAN: It seems to me that in spite of the fact that
the judiciary traditionally has been non-political, it simply must find
a way to work effectively with Congress. There is no doubt that
federal jurisdiction is a political decision to be made by Congress. I
also have no doubt whatsoever that jurisdiction will continue to
expand, unless the federal courts can find an effective way of working
with Congress. The courts also must show Congress the crisis that
federal judges believe will occur if caseload increases, of the magni-
tude forecast by the -Plan, which now has been attributed to me,
actually come true.
(Laughter)
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you. Judge Barker?
JUDGE BARKER: I would like to say that the planning process that
has resulted in the publication of the Long Range Plan is just a
beginning step. The Committee knew that, and the Judicial Confer-
ence knew that. This Plan is the groundwork that we have tried to lay
for responsible planning to be ongoing from this point forward. We
do not know exactly what shape the next stage should assume. We do
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not know whether it should be an implementation stage in that sense;
or whether we should start structuring experiments in the federal
judiciary to address some of these problems. There is a sense, in
having finished this part of the process, that we have a lot on our
plate. It will require the best efforts of every judge in the system and
of everyone who has hitched his or her wagon to this particular star.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you, Judge Barker. Judge Rein-
hardt?
JUDGE REINHARDT: Well, I guess I just have not hitched my
wagon to this procedure because I do not really see this Long Range
Plan as greatly significant one way or the other. It is not, in the big
picture of things in this nation, of great moment. I do not know what
it is that they think they are going to change, but I do not mind if
they continue to study these plans. We have a Long Range Planning
Committee on our court. They make reports every year; they are all
very happy.
I think it is good practice to study these things, but to me, that is
not the problem that confronts the federal courts. I am concerned
about ajudiciary that is not giving adequate protection to individual
rights. I am concerned about a judiciary whose jurisdiction is being
limited more and more. I am concerned about the difficulty of
obtaining justice in federal court. Those are the things I think we
should worry about. I think we need more judges for one thing: to
see if we can deal with the kinds of problems we have. I think it is
regrettable when civil rights litigants no longer can win cases in
federal courts. I think it is regrettable when civil rights litigants tell
you they are going to go to state courts because the federal court has
suddenly decided that the Constitution is colorblind, and that blacks
no longer have any problems. Those are the kinds of problems that
concern me. Largely, however, these are problems that individual
judges cannot do much about. It is a question of philosophy, and of
Congress' political approach to the courts. I think that we just have
to wait and hope that the federal judiciary returns to what it once
was-one of the most important institutions in this nation-a leader
for fairness and decency. It still is a place that should, and frequently
does, protect the individual and the rights envisaged by the Constitu-
tion. It is a noble institution that should be preserved and expanded.
I would not worry about trying to limit jurisdiction. I would worry
about protecting the traditional, historic jurisdiction that the federal
courts have had. I would worry about protecting habeas corpus, and
I would worry about seeing that there are enough judges to do justice
for all the people in this country. I think we need more judges to
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address the kinds of problems that already exist. I would recognize
that computers cannot decide cases and thatjudges do. Judges have
to read every single brief that comes before them. Judges have to
read the briefs and they have to hear the oral arguments; they should
write opinions and they should do justice. That may require more
money than we are willing to spend now, but times do change; let us
hope that Congress will spend more money later and that we will have
enough courts and enough judges-not just enough policemen and
prosecutors.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: Thank you, Judge Reinhardt. Finally,
Judge Becker?
JUDGE BECKER: I want to close by agreeing with Professor Nihan.
We have to do a betterjob publicizing our problem and tuning in the
Congress because that is the only way we are going to alleviate much
more serious problems down the line.
PROFESSOR ROBBINS: This ends our panel discussion on the
future of the federal courts, but it is certainly not the end of the
debate. That debate is going to continue in the halls of Congress, in
the Executive Branch, in the Judicial Conference, in bar association
meetings, and in academia as well. I am pleased to say that the
debate certainly will continue here at the Washington College of Law.
The quest for both effective and fair justice in the courts of this
nation should be a never-ending one. I should add that this
discussion should not be restricted to the federal courts. In the
coming year, we hope to host a conference on the future of the state
and local courts as well.
Personally, as well as on behalf of the Washington College of Law
of American University, I thank the distinguished panelists, Chief
Justice RehnquistJudge BeckerJudge Reinhardt, ChiefJudge Barker,
and Professor Nihan.
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